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Under determinate sentencing,  when the defendant is 
sentenced to prison, the judge sets a specific term, and there is 
no discretionary release by a parole board  (Tonry,  1987 and 1988; 
Reitz and Reitz, 1993).  Its antithesis is indeterminate 
sentencing, under which the judge imposes a sentence that is a 
broad range of prison time, and the parole board decides when to 
release the inmate within the range or even earlier than the 
minimum.  With determinate sentencing,  one can estimate the actual 
term to be served by taking the sentence length set by the judge 
and subtracting credits expected for pre-trial detention and for 
good time in prison. 
Determinate sentencing is one of the most important 
@  sentencing innovations in recent decades, and the American Bar 
Association Sentencing Standards in 1993 adopted it, after 
supporting indeterminate sentencing for many decades (Reitz  and 
Reitz, 1993).  Its major rationale is the belief that imprisonment 
does not effectively rehabilitate inmates and that parole board 
decisions are often arbitrary and not based on the supposed 
rehabilitation of the prisoner  (e.g.,  von Hirsch and Hanrahan, 
1981; Casper, 1984; Griswold and Wiatrowski, 1983).  Those 
advancing determinate sentencing emphasize other goals for 
imprisonment, primarily deterrence, incapacitation, and Ifjust 
deserts" punishment. 
.- 
Between 1976 and 1984 determinate sentencing laws were 
adopted in ten states, California, Colorado, Connecticut,  a 
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Justice.Illinois, Indiana,  Maine, Minnesota, New Mexico, North Carolina, 
and Washington (Marvell  and Moody, 1996a; Tonry, 1988; see Bureau 
of Justice Assistance, 1998).  Then no additional states adopted 
determinate sentencing for more than a decade, until Virginia did 
for crimes committed after January 1,  1995.  In these states, 
judges sentence defendants to a specific term, rather than a range 
of years.  Also, all eleven states abolished parole, and all 
provide for term reduction through good time and other factors. 
The possible reductions usually vary from approximately one-third 
to one-half  of the sentence (von  Hirsch and Hanrahan, 1981). 
0 
Determinate sentencing laws in seven of the eleven states 
narrow the judges' discretion by establishing presumptive ranges, 
which judges must honor, except that they can depart if they give 
reasons in writing  (Marvell  and Moody, 1996a; Tonry, 1987).  These 
laws are found in California, Indiana,  Minnesota, New Mexico, 
North Carolina,  Virginia, and Washington.  The remaining four 
ie 
determinate sentencing states permit judges to sentence within a 
fairly wide range, although only in Maine is the range as broad as 
it was under indeterminate sentencing.  Because determinate 
sentencing laws, except in Maine, establish minimum prison 
sentences for major  felony convictions,  they are mandatory minimum 
sentencing laws, although not as strict as the typical narrow 
mandatory sentencing law (e.g.,  for committing a felony with a 
firearm) in that they allow judges to depart from the minimum if 
reasons are put in writing and if the appellate court does not 
object to the reasoning. 
2 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has
not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the
author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of
Justice.The impacts on court delay and the number of  trials held 
have long been major concerns for those studying sentencing.  They 
are more important with respect to determinate sentencing laws 
then other sentencing changes; the determinate sentencing laws 
affect sentencing in all felony cases, whereas other sentencing 
reforms (except for sentencing guidelines) affect sentencing in 
few cases.  For example, three strikes laws and mandatory minimums 
for violent crimes or gun crimes pertain to only a small portion 
of prosecutions, and even in these they seldom have much impact 
because the judges and attorneys circumvent the laws and because 
the defendants would usually receive a substantial sentence in any 
event, at least as great as required by the law (e.g.,  Tonry, 
1992).  Because their application is a fairly rare event, these 
other 
rates 
sentencing reforms can have little impact on overall trial 
and court delay. 
Expected Impacts of the Laws on Guilty Pleas and Delay 
There exists considerable theory and a moderate amount of 
research concerning the impact of determinate sentencing on 
decisions to go to trial or to plea guilty,  and a lesser amount of 
theory and research concerning court delay.  The theory most 
commonly advanced with respect to plea bargaining, derived from 
general bargaining theory, is that agreement is easier when the 
parties have more information about what the consequences are of a 
proposed agreement.  If the agreement leaves the ultimate results 
uncertain, parties are reluctant to give up  rights and other 
3 
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increases certainty because 1) the judge's discretion is severely 
limited in most determinate sentencing states,  and 2) the 
substitution  of good time credits for parole greatly increases the 
ability to forecast the actual prison term (e.g.,  McCoy, 1984; 
Tonry, 1987:165-166).  This theory applies whether plea bargaining 
is predominantly sentence bargaining or charge bargaining.  With 
sentence bargaining (where  the prosecution and defendant agree to 
a sentence and present the agreement to the court) the length of 
prison term is more predictable under determinate sentencing 
because release is not established by the parole board.  With 
charge bargaining (where  the defendant pleads to some charges and 
the prosecution drops other charges, often charges in other 
indictments) the presumptive sentence and actual prison term are 
. @  narrowly prescribed. 
A second theory why determinate sentencing might facilitate 
pleas is based on the fact that, due to the restrictions on the 
judges' discretion,  determinate sentencing can increases 
prosecutors' power.  That is, the charge agreed to largely 
determines the sentence, and the prosecutor determines the charge. 
Meithe (1987)  reasoned that determinate sentencing would increase 
pleas if prosecutors used their discretionary power to reduce 
charges to entice defendants to plead. 
On the other hand, there are arguments why determinate 
sentencing might reduce pleas.  First, with indeterminate 
sentencing the upper end of the sentence range is often very high 
4 
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not run the risk of very long terms; determinate sentencing limits 
this fear (Tonry,  1987:165-66).  Second, the prison term called 
for under determinate sentencing is often relatively short, such 
that prosecutors have little room to offer incentives for 
bargaining and defendants might believe that they have little to 
lose by going to trial (Clarke,  1983; Alschuler, 1978).  Third, 
Meithe (1987)  argues that when the determinate sentencing law 
gives the judge little discretion, the likelihood of sentence 
bargaining is reduced; unless this is counterbalanced by an 
increase in charge bargaining, the overall level of plea 
bargaining will decline. 
The impact of  determinate sentencing on court delay is more 
speculative.  The determinate sentencing procedures are often more 
'0 complex than the procedures they replaced, and some argue that 
this can delay disposition (e.g.,  Clarke, 1993:4).  If 
determinate sentencing leads to more pleas and fewer trials,  judge 
time and other court resources should be freed to reduce backlogs. 
However, most research has found that more pleas do not 
necessarily translate into less delay (e.g.,  Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, 1984; Marvell, Luskin, and Moody, 1988), perhaps 
because courts generally assign enough resources to criminal cases 
(and away from civil cases) to keep backlogs under control. 
Finally, the added certainty provided by determinate sentencing 
facilitates plea bargaining and is likely to induce defendants to 
5 
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0  trials are scheduled. 
In this respect it would be helpful to obtain the opinions 
of judges and lawyers concerning their perceptions of the impact 
of the laws.  Since all but one of the laws were passed at least 
15 years ago, however, too much time has lapsed to get reliable 
accounts.  The exception is Virginia, where the law went into 
effect in 1995.  Thus,  we interviewed a small sample of 
.  ., .  , .. 
C”. 
knowledgeable participants (four  judges, five defense attorneys, 
eight prosecutors, and three court administrative personnel). 
Almost all said that they noticed little impact on delay.  An 
exception is that two persons said that minor cases tended to be 
decided sooner:  when the sentencing law did not call for prison 
sentences, defendants desired to finish their cases quickly, which 
would not have happened under the old sentencing laws because the 
defendants were not sure that they would escape prison sentences. 
The respondents also could discern little impact on guilty 
-0 
plea rate.  Most noted that the new law makes plea negotiations 
easier because it provides a convenient beginning point for 
negotiations, and it helps defense attorneys explain to their 
clients what to expect.  But that was not seen as a factor that 
__ 
produced more pleas. 
The biggest impact seen was on jury trials, due to the fact 
that,  unlike almost all other states,  Virginia has jury 
sentencing.  That is, if there is a jury trial, the jury, rather 
than the judge, determines the sentence.  Until 2000 Virginia law 
6 
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determinate sentence law, and lawyers and defendants believed that 
jurors still sentenced as if they were governed by indeterminate 
sentencing.  That is, jurors tended to give sentences under the 
misapprehension that the defendant would be let out on parole well 
before the end of the term.  Therefore,  the determinate sentencing 
law caused defendants to be wary of jury trials, opting for judge 
trials. 
Another factor discouraging jury trials is that soon after 
the determinate law, a statute permitted jurors to view the 
defendant’s  criminal record during the sentencing phase (but  of 
course not before the verdict).  Therefore,  defendants with many 
prior convictions become less likely to request jury trials. 
Research on the Impact of the Laws 
Many studies have evaluated determinate sentencing laws 
(see  the summaries in Cohen and Tonry [1983] and Marvel1 and Moody 
[1996a]),  but most did not addressed the impact on court delay or 
trial and guilty plea rates.  Apparently there has been only one 
study of delay in this regard.  Clarke (1983) studied twelve North 
Carolina courts in the two years before the determinate sentencing 
law went into effect and two years afterwards.  He found that the 
time to decision declined moderately between the two periods, 
which he cautiously attributed to the determinate sentencing law. 
More research has addressed the impact on plea bargaining 
and trials.  In his North Carolina study Clarke  (1983)  found that 
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and two years after the law.  In Minnesota,  Meithe  (1987)  found 
that the plea rate went from .76  in a year before the law, to .65 
in a year soon after the law, to .75  in a year starting two years 
after the law; these results could be interpreted either as a 
slight lessening of plea rates or as evidence of little change. 
The rest of the research on this topic concerns the 
California determinate sentencing law.  Casper, Brereton,  and Neal 
(1982,  1983) studied three California courts during the 3.5  years 
before the law and 1.5 years afterwards,  and they found that plea 
bargaining rates changed little.  This finding is contrary to the 
opinions of lawyers and judges interviewed,  who believed that the 
plea rate would increase under determinate sentencing. 
Utz also found that the California law had little or no 
impact on plea rates,  based on a study of trends in five courts 
from two years before the law to the year after (as  reported in 
Cohen and Tonry, 1983).  On the other hand,  McCoy  (1984)  concluded 
that the California law facilitated  plea bargaining because the 
state-wide  guilty plea rate for four years after the law was 
greater than the rate during the two years prior.  This 
0 
interpretation, however, is uncertain because the plea rate grew 
throughout the period studied, and the before-and-after  change may 
result only from a secular trend. 
Thus,  the studies suggest that determinate sentencing has 
little impact on plea rates and that it reduces delay.  The 
evidence, however, is not strong.  There is only one study of 
8 
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and their results are not consistent.  More important, the before- 
and-after  research designs used are weak.  Three reviews of this 
literature (Cohen  and Tonry, 1983:442-444; Marvel1 and Moody, 
1996a; Tonry, 1988:272-275)  severely criticize the research , 
designs, mainly because the short time spans mean that apparent 
changes might be only parts of long-term  trends, because the 
before or after periods might be idiosyncratic for reasons 
unrelated to the determinate sentencing laws, and because the full 
impact of the law might not become clear until much later as the 
participants become accustomed to the new system. 
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11.  MULTIPLE TIME SERIES RESEARCH DESIGN 
The present research estimates the impact of determinate 
sentencing laws in seven states on court delay and plea rates by 
using the multiple time series design,  which is a much stronger 
design than used in the earlier research.  The data are court- 
level statistics  obtained from state court annual reports.  The 
seven states are California,  Connecticut, Illinois,  New Mexico, 
North Carolina, Virginia, and Washington.  These states have 
available state court data for at least two years before the 
determinate sentencing law went into effect and four years 
afterwards.  (Four  determinate sentencing states,  Colorado, 
Indiana,  Maine and Minnesota, do not have data fitting this 
criteria and, thus, are not included in this study.)  The delay 
-:a  analysis uses six states, since Washington do not have delay data 
The trial rate analysis uses also six states;  New Mexico does not 
have data on the number of trials. 
Each state has from 18 to 25 years of data  (see  Table l), 
and the multiple time series design pools these data.  These 
states have a total of 192 courts with data, 179 with trial data 
and 154 with delay data.  The data sets have approximately 3500 
observations for the trial rate analysis and 3000 for the delay 
analysis. 
The multiple time series has long been considered the best 
evaluation design when, as is the case here, random experiments 
are not possible  (e.g.,  Lempert, 1966:120-131; Campbell and 
10 
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al., 1979).  The design is now widely used in criminology (e.g., 
Lott and Mustard, 1997; Marvel1 and Moody, 1996b).  Among other 
advantages, the design 1) provides a large sample size, 2) 
provides control groups because the other courts act as controls 
when analyzing the impact of  the law on each individual court,  and 
3) permits one to enter a large number of control variables. 
The unit of analysis is the court, which depending on the 
state. is organized at the county level or the multi-county 
district level.  In  California the court units the same as the 
county.  In Connecticut the unit is also the county, except that 
one county is divided into several units.  In Washington, they are 
mainly county, but a few counties are joined to combined a unit. 
In Illinois,  New Mexico,  North Carolina, and Virginia the units 
are usually multi-county,  and only counties with sizeable cities 
have their own court unit.  A problem encountered is that several  ..,e 
states split court units during the period of this study. 
Connecticut Stamford split off from Bridgeport, in Illinois 
District 12 split off from District 21.  In  North Carolina 3rd, 
4th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, llth, 15th, 16th, 17th, 19th, 20th,  25th, 
27th and 30th Districts split.  In  Washington, Mason and Thurston 
In 
Counties were combined in one district and split in 1987,  and 
Chelan and Douglas were combined in one district and split in 
1999.  In these circumstances,  data were joined after the split, 
such that the series for each state is the same as if there were 
no splits. 
11 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has
not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the
author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of
Justice.The courts are those that handle felony cases, and the 
cases studied here are almost all felony cases (in  some states, a 
few misdemeanors, such as appeals from the limited jurisdiction 
trial court, are included).  Dependent variables in the 
regressions are delay, trials and guilty pleas for each year in 
each court.  The most important independent variables are dummy 
variables for the determinate sentencing laws.  (That is, the 
design here is a multiple interrupted time series design,  but with 
far more controls than available with a single interrupted time 
series.)  The standard regression procedure for a multiple time 
series is the fixed effects model  (Mundlak,  1978; Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld, 1991:224-226; Hsiao, 1986:41-58); this has dummy 
variables for each unit and each year (except the first).  The 
unit dummies mean that cross-section  variance does not enter the 
results, thus the specification  problems that hinder cross-section 
analyses are not encountered.  The year dummies control for 
changes that occur over the courts in all seven states generally 
(this  control is somewhat inexact because data for three states is 
on a fiscal year basis, as seen in Table 1).  They control for 
variables not entered in the analysis to the extent that such 
variables raise or lower the dependent variable mean over the 
courts for any year.  This has the practical effect of making all 
other courts, especially those in other states, control courts for 
the purpose of studying the impact of determinate sentencing laws 
on any one court.  The year dummies, however, do not control for 
year-to-year  changes in a state that differ from general changes 
0 
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in the seven states.  Additional controls, therefore, include 
separate trend variables for each state, as described later. 
The use of year dummies and trend variables are especially 
important because there are broad state-wide and nation-wide 
trends in both trial rates and delay.  In general, trial rates are 
declining and delay is increasing.  The coefficient on the law 
variable, in the absence of the controls for trends, would be 
spurious in a negative direction in the trial rate regressions and 
in a positive direction in the delay regressions. 
The regressions were conducted in levels, rather than 
differences, for two reasons.  First, with the fixed effect model, 
using levels is the proper procedure even if variables are not 
stationary (Phillips  and Moon, 1999).  Second, modeling the laws 
with dummy variables is very imprecise when dependent variables 
-0 are differenced.  The law variables also must be differences 
(otherwise,  the law dummy coefficients represent expediential 
impacts, which do not have any reasonable interpretation in the 
present situation),  but the variable would greatly understate 
impact of the law unless its full impact occurs felt immediately. 
The continuous variables are expressed as natural logs to 
moderate the impact of outliers and of the largest court units. 
Heteroscedasticity is likely because variation in ratio variables 
is greater in smaller courts,  and it is corrected by using 
weighted regressions, with the weight determined by Breusch-Pagan 
test  (population  to the  .2 power for the delay analysis, and to 
the  -4  power for the trial and plea analyses).  We also tested for 
13 
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law dummies.  The fixed effects and state trends did encounter 
collinearity problems, but that has no impact on the results. 
Autocorrelation is encountered in all regressions,  as 
indicated by the Durbin-Watson  statistics given in the regressions 
tables (Tables  4 to 20).  The Durbin-Watsons  are generally 1.3 or 
less, and as a rule of thumb figures below approximately 1.8 
suggest autocorrelation  problems.  The presence of autocorrelaton 
means that the t ratios are probably inflated, such that results 
that appear to be statistically significant might not be. 
mitigate autocorrelaton  problems by adding lagged dependent 
variables, although this causes the loss of one year of data in 
the before-law  period.  The lagged dependent variable also 
provides an extra control, because it incorporate factors that 
affect the dependent variable, although only the lagged component 
of the impact of such factors.  In practice, entering the lagged 
We 
-0 
dependent variable reduces the apparent impact of  the determinate 
sentencing laws in the regressions,  both in terms of coefficient 
size and significance levels.  It is not possible to claim, 
however, that these results are more accurate than with out the 
lagged dependent variables because they might be due to losing the 
first year of data, and thus cutting the before-law  data period to 
two or three years in some states (see  Table 1) 
14 
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111. VARIABLES AND  DATA 
The continuous variables are from state court annual 
reports published by state court administrative offices, 
supplemented in a few states by unpublished statistical reports. 
These data are often used in research,  but they suffer from the 
fact that the researcher is limited to the data categories 
specified by the courts.  Data from court annual reports are 
probably more accurate than data that researchers obtain from case 
files; the court staff who compile data are knowledgeable about 
court operations and have a long-term  stake in the accuracy of the 
data.  The data elements and the states studied are described more 
thoroughly later. 
Determinate Sentencinq Laws 
The effective dates of the determinate sentencing laws are 
given in Table 1.  We constructed two variables to represent the 
laws, used in separate regressions.  The first is a step dummy. 
Each determinate sentencing variable is scored zero in the years 
before its effective date, and one in the years afterwards.  For 
the year the law went into effect, the variable is the portion of 
the year (or  fiscal year if the data are collected on a fiscal 
year basis) in which the law was in effect, less one-third. The 
latter adjustment is necessary because determinate sentencing and 
eliminating parole are applicable only to crimes committed on or 
after the effective date of the law, and because the median time 
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1992).  Most laws went into effect at mid-year,  and the variable 
is .17  for that year in states with calendar year data and .67  for 
the next year in states with fiscal year data. 
After this adjustment, the shortest number of years before 
the law for the delay analysis is three years (California  and 
Connecticut) and the first year of the step dummy is .67.  Only in 
the fifth year does the dummy reach one.  The shortest number of 
years for the trial rate analysis is essentially three.  In 
Washington, there are two years of data, and the step dummy is 
only .17 in the third year; so for all practical matters there are 
data for three years beforehand. 
The period after the law is at least ten years for all 
states except Virginia, where the law went into effect at the 
beginning of 1995 and data .runs  through 1999.  Thus, the step 
dummy is scored .67  for 1995 and one for the next four years. 
Using the step dummy assumes that the law has an immediate 
impact, and the impact stays constant after the first year.  If 
the law has an impact, the impact pattern departs from this model, 
as a practical matter, the coefficient on the step dummy 
represents  much of the impact as long as the step model is not too 
far from reality.  Otherwise, use of the step dummy can miss 
impacts. 
Therefore,  we use a second procedure for representing the 
laws, assuming that any impact of the laws occurs gradually.  This 
is a distributed lag variable, which posits that the impact is 
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TO make the distributed lag variable, we create lags of the step 
dummies, add them, and divide by the number used.  Here we add the 
current-year  step dummy and five lagged versions, and divide the 
totals by six.  The variable, therefore, is one after six years 
and is a regularly increasing decimal for years one to six. 
We constructed variables 1) for each state law and 2)  for 
all laws combined.  First, all court units within a state have the 
same variable, and it is scored zero for all observations in court 
units in other states.  The second is a single dummy variable that 
encompasses all the laws,  which is zero only in states and years 
that do not have a determinate sentencing law.  The coefficient on 
the single variable might be seen as a rough average of the 
impacts of  the several state laws.  But it has two problems. 
First, it might be dominated by states that have more court units, 
simply because observations in these states comprise a an 
excessively large portion of the total number of observations. 
:a 
Second,  it hides the differences between states,  and if the 
differences are sizeable (that is, if the regression violates the 
assumption of constant coefficients due to the fact that 
determinate sentencing laws have different impact in different 
." 
states) then the coefficient on the single aggregate variable can 
be biased.  Therefore,  we present the results with both the 
aggregate variable and with separate determinate sentencing law 
variables in each state.  The latter variables, again, are zero 
everywhere except in the state in question,  where they are the 
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determinate sentencing law variable is the sum of the several 
state determinate sentencing law variables.  0 
..  c 
Court Data -  General Considerations 
The criminal cases statistics used are for felonies and are 
counted after being bound over to the general jurisdiction court 
after a preliminary hearing or indictment in grand jury 
indictment.  Often cases originally filed as felonies are 
downgraded to misdemeanor charges.  Whether these cases are 
counted depends on where the change is made.  If made in the 
limited jurisdiction court,  before the case is bound over, the 
cases is not included in the statistics (this  is generally the 
case in California).  If the change is made later, the cases are 
included in the felony case data.  In Illinois there is no limited  "10 
jurisdiction court,  and felony filings are the number of original 
felony complaints less those that are transferred to the 
misdemeanor dockets. 
The unit of count differs between states.  In California, 
New Mexico, and Washington it is the defendant.  Thus if a felony 
complaint lists two defendants it is counted as two cases,  and if 
two defendants are tried in the same trial, it is counted as two 
trials.  In Connecticut and North Carolina the unit of count is 
the case, and there would be only one filing and one trial in the 
above examples. 
disposed, and pending data, but it is the defendant for trial 
In Illinois the count is the case for filing, 
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brought against each defendant. When a defendant, for example, is 
charged with two similar burglaries or with rape and murder in a 
single crime, there are two counts and thus, two cases.  State- 
wide the number of felony counts filed is approximately twice the 
number of defendants charged, although this ratio differs 
substantially from circuit to circuit.  In effect, the case 
statistics are affected by prosecutors' charging practices. 
The differences between states in case-counting  practices 
do not affect the analysis because the fixed effect model controls 
for overall differences  between states (and  between court units). 
There is a problem, however, if practices changes in some states 
or units, but not in others.  In this regard, possible variations 
in prosecutors' practices could be a problem in Virginia. 
Plea and Trial Rates 
Measuring the extent of plea bargaining is more difficult 
than apparent.  The most obvious.measure,  the number of plea 
dispositions divided by the number of total dispositions, 
encounters several problems.  First, state courts do not often 
gather data on plea dispositions, and only four of the seven 
states studied have such data (California,  Illinois,  North 
Carolina, and Virginia). 
Second, it is probably not correct to categorize 
dismissals as dispositions that are not the result of plea 
bargaining.  Dismissals are agreed to by both prosecution and 
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defendant pleads guilty to one indictment in return for having one 
or more other indictments dismissed.  Thus,  one can argue that 
dismissals should be classified as plea agreements, such that the 
extent of plea bargaining is the portion of cases that go to 
trial, the number of trial dispositions  divided by the total 
number of dispositions. 
Data for this measure are available for six of the seven 
states (the  exception is New Mexico).  Also, for five states there 
are separate data for jury trials, as opposed to judge trials, 
which permits analysis of the jury trial rate; this is a better 
measure of the trial court workload, because jury trials typically 
are more time-consuming  than judge trials.  In summary, the basic 
analysis with six states use the trial rate as a measure of the 
extent of pleas, and alternate regressions with fewer states uses 
the guilty plea rate and the non-jury-trial  rate. 
In addition to these three rates,  we construct alternate 
variables that are the number of pleas, trials,  and jury trials. 
Because these vary greatly according to the size of the court 
units, we construct per capita variables (dividing  by population 
and multiplying by 10,000).  Without this adjustment, the 
coefficients on the law variables would vary greatly depending on 
court size, thus violating the regression assumption that 
coefficients are constant. 
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The most common indicator of a court's docket is the 
backlog of cases, the number pending in the court at the end of 
the year.  The absolute size of the backlog is a poor indicator of 
delay, however, because the threat that backlogs present depends 
on the court's  ability to dispose of cases.  Therefore, our 
initial measure of delay is the backlog index, which is the number 
pending at the end of the year divided by the number disposed 
during the year. 
Clark and Merryman (1976);  Clark (1981);  Church et al. (1978:l-2); 
DonVito (1972);  Marvel1 and Luskin (1991).  Six of the seven 
This measure has been used by, among others, 
states have data for the backlog index, the exception being 
Washington. 
In California instead of using the number of pending cases, 
which is not available (and  not very meaningful since in many 
counties much of the case processing, including plea bargaining, 
takes place in the limited jurisdiction courts).  Instead we use 
the number of  criminal cases awaiting trial.  This is a smaller 
number than the number pending, and thus the backlog index is 
smaller in California than in other states, but this does not bias 
the regression results because the fixed effects model, with the 
court unit dummies,  controls for the overall levels.  That is, 
there are no cross section  comparisons.  The years for which the 
backlog index is available are given in Table 1.  There are at 
least two years of data before each law. 
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0  the number of cases filed that have not been disposed.  Some 
courts conduct such counts each year, and some count only 
periodically and estimate pending cases in intervening years by 
adding filings to the prior year pending and subtracting the 
number disposed.  These estimates can become inaccurate after 
several years. 
It is helpful when courts publish pending data for the 
beginning of the year as well as the end of the year.  The 
beginning pending count often includes adjustments (which  are 
seldom large), and thus is a better measure of the number pending 
at the end of the prior year than is found in the prior year 
reports.  Thus, in New Mexico and North Carolina pending data used 
here are the beginning pending for the next year (except for years 
in which there are no data for the next year).  In addition, 
Illinois published beginning pending data, but only for early 
years such that the above adjustment is not feasible.  However,  we 
use the beginning pending figure for 1977 for the end pending in 
1976, thus extending the time series back an additional year. 
Adjustments based on recounts can be determined by comparing 
beginning pending to prior year ending pending, or by comparing 
end pending in one year to end pending in the prior year.  That 
is, end pending plus positions less filings should approximately 
equal end pending in the prior years (if the figures match 
exactly, it is usually a sign that pending figures were estimated 
rather than based on actual counts).  If recounts of pending cases 
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Justice.are made infrequently,  there can be substantial mismatches, which 
indicates that the pending data in the years before the counts are 
inaccurate.  When that happens,  we delete the pending data.  As a  e 
rule of thumb,  we dropped pending cases for a court if recounts 
resulted in adjustment of more than 25 percent in the number of 
pending cases.  For this reason we deleted pending cases for 
District 16 in Illinois,  Districts 4 and 12 in New Mexico, and 
Circuits 1,  3,  4,  10,  11,  14, 17, 18,  29, 21, 25, 28, and 29 in 
Virginia.  In Connecticut pending and disposition data are dropped 
for Danbury after 1994 due to an extreme jump in inactive pending 
cases.  Also in that state pending data  (as  well as all other 
data) before 1981 are score missing data for Ansonia-Milford  and 
Danbury districts because the two began operations in 1979 (with 
zero beginning pending cases), the first year of data for that 
state. 
In California,  the measure of pending cases, those awaiting 
trial, does not permit use of this consistency check.  However, 
the Administrative Office of the Courts informed us that in 
several counties data for dispositions and guilty pleas were 
greatly overstated in early years because guilty pleas in felony 
cases,  which are arranged and accepted in the Municipal Court but . 
formally entered in the Superior Court,  were not included in 
Superior Court statistics, as they should have been according to 
the Office's guidelines.  The counties affected are Alamada, 
Fresno,  Humbolt, Nevada, San Joaquin, and San Luis Obispo.  Guilty 
plea and total disposition data are scored as missing data there. 
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available.  The major one is simply the number of pending cases 
per capita,  which is a simpler measure than the backlog ratio 
because it does not incorporate disposition data.  One advantage 
is that it permits us to include the California counties where we 
deleted the disposition data.  Pending cases are divided by 
population so that its variation does not differ tremendously 
between large and small courts, as the number pending alone does. 
Alternate Measures 
As a check on the delay measures described above, and to a 
lesser extent the trial measures, we use alternate measures where 
available.  These vary greatly between states in number and type. 
The alternate delay measures are listed in Table 2 for the four 
states where they are available, and these (as  well as pending 
cases per capita) are compared to the backlog index.  Later the 
alternate delay measures are used in separate analyses to test the 
fragility of results for regressions  which use the backlog index. 
The multiple time series regression can incorporate different 
delay measures for the several states because the cross-state 
differences are controlled for by the court dummy variables. 
In Table 2 we compare the delay measures to the backlog 
index using three methods.  The first is the simple correlation 
(using  state-wide  data sets), which is always highly significant. 
However, this can be misleading because delay observations in a 
particular court unit over the years are not independent. 
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adding dummies for each court unit  (again  using state-wide  data 
sets).  These control for unit differences.  But it runs the risk 
that relationships are spurious simply because both measures 
increased or declined generally over the period studied. 
Therefore, the third comparison procedure is to conduct the 
regression with both the court unit dummies and linear trend 
variables.  There are separate trend variables for each court 
unit. 
As can be seen in Table 2,  the relationships between the 
backlog index and the various delay measures differ greatly.  The 
number of pending cases per capita, a measure used in the 
regressions in tandem with the backlog index, is always related to 
the latter to a highly statistically significant extent, as 
indicated by the t-ratios (which,  as a rule of thumb, are 
significant if above 2, and are significant to the .0001 level for 
any t-ratio  above 3.8).  All other measures are highly 
significantly related to backlog ratio,  with the exception of two 
measures in Virginia in the regression with the trend variables. 
There is no obvious reason for this exception. 
Only one state,  Virginia, has alternate measures for  trial 
variables.  Here the number of juries impaneled and the number of 
jury days are very closely related to the jury trial rate 
3). 
(Table 
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The multiple time series design enables us to enter a large 
number of control variables and still regain a very large number 
of degrees of freedom.  The court dummies, as discussed earlier, 
control for unknown factors to the extent that they affect 
individual courts differently from other courts.  The year dummies 
control for factors that affect delay and plea rates in individual 
years more than other years across all the courts.  The court and 
year dummies,  however,  do not control for factors unique to a 
particular court or to a particular state in a particular year. 
0 
This is mitigated by entering state-specific  time trend 
variables, which control for trends in each state to the extent 
that they depart from general trends captured by year dummies. 
Each of the trend variables is coded zero for all observations 
except in the particular state,  where it is a simple counter. 
Without these variables, a determinate sentencing law might appear 
to have, for example,  a moderating impact on delay simply because 
the secular trend over the period studied is towards less delay 
than experienced in the other courts (the  latter is captured by 
the year dummies). 
0 
We also enter several control variables, factors that may 
be associated with delay and plea or trial rates.  Three are 
continuous variables.  The number of judges on each court in each 
year is entered because more judges can be expected to reduce 
delay by handling more cases and more judges might reduce plea 
rates because it becomes feasible to hold more trials.  In 
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the number of judges in each court unit because judges are 
regularly transferred from one district to another; consequently 
the number of judges for each unit in these states is the number 
for the state as a whole (again,  the fixed effects model means 
that the judge variable does not operate differently in these two 
states just because the numbers are higher). 
The second variable is the number of criminal filings, 
entered because caseload increases can temporarily increase 
backlogs and because large caseloads might put pressure on the 
lawyers and judges to limit the time required for trials and, 
thus, to increase plea dispositions. 
The third is the number of  civil filings, because civil 
caseloads can drain resources from the criminal side.  The civil 
data is for regular civil, mainly contract and tort cases,  and 
excluding specialized subjects such as juvenile, domestic 
relations, and probate.  An  exception is that the New Mexico and 
Washington civil data include domestic relations cases (mainly 
divorce) because statistical reports do not separate out domestic 
relations cases during the early years of the analysis. 
We do not include delay measures in the trial rate 
regression, or trial rate in the delay regression, due to 
simultaneity.  That is,  courts are likely to respond to increased 
delay by reducing trial rates, and increased trial rates are 
likely to increase delay. 
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.  ImDact of Determinate Sentencinq Laws on Delay 
As indicated in the prior section,  the delay analysis (as 
well as trial and guilty plea analyses) are conducted using four 
separate options:  1) the delay measure is expressed both as a 
rate (pending  divided by dispositions) and in a per capita form, 
2) regressions are run with and without lagged dependent 
variables, 3)  the law is represented by a single aggregate law 
variable and as separate variables for each state law, and 4) the 
law is represented as step variables and as distributed lag 
variables. 
This results in sixteen separate regressions for the delay 
0  analysis.  In Tables 4 and 5 the determinate sentencing law is 
represented by a step dummy, and in Tables 6  and 7 the laws are 
expressed as distributed lags.  Tables 4 and 6 use single law 
variables, and Tables 5 and 7 use separate law variables for each 
state.  In all, there is little evidence that the laws affected 
delay when using the step dummy, although there is more evidence 
of a positive impact (that is, leading to more delay) than the 
opposite.  When using a single aggregate step dummy (Table  41,  the 
coefficient on the law variable is positive throughout,  although 
only significant when the dependent variable is pending cases per 
capita and when there is no lagged dependent variable. 
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@  determinate sentencing law step dummies for the six states that 
have data for the backlog ratio and pending cases.  Judging from 
Part 1 of Table 5,  perhaps the California determinate sentencing 
law might increased delay,  but when the lagged dependent variable 
is entered this effect is greatly reduced.  There is also some 
meager evidence that the New Mexico law caused more delay. 
...  ..  . 
,_.  . 
Using a distributed lag instead of a step dummy presents a 
very different picture.  In  Table 6,  the aggregate law dummy 
variables are always positive and significant.  The results with 
individual state dummies support give the same impression (Table 
7).  The California and North Carolina laws have the greatest 
impact, followed by the New Mexico law.  The coefficient on the 
Connecticut law is also sizeable, and it is significant to the  .10 
level when pending cases are the dependent variable.  There is no 
sign that the Virginia law affected delay.  That is consistent 
with the findings from the interviews; the impression of most was 
the law had no discernable impact on delay. 
i@ 
The analysis with individual state law variables is further 
extended in Table 8  by substituting other delay measures that are 
available in three states,  Connecticut,  North Carolina, and 
Virginia  (data  for the alternate delay measure in Illinois  used in 
Table 2  was not available before the state’s  determinate 
sentencing law went into effect).  The alternate delay measures 
provide partial tests of the robustness of the results in Tables 5 
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@  there are substantiated. 
As for Connecticut, the results with a step dummy in Table 
8 suggest a slight possibility of a negative impact on delay, 
which is also the impression one gets from Table 5.  With the 
distributed lag, the coefficients are positive but not 
significant,  which also is consistent with Table 7. 
North Carolina,  with eight alternate delay measures, 
produces greatly varying results with the step dummy.  This  might 
be due in  part to the fact that data for most  alternative 
measures there have data for only a few years before the laws (in 
Table 8, the years in parentheses are the beginning year when the 
delay measure started).  In Table 5 there is little sign of an 
impact when using the step dummy.  Most measures produce similar 
results in Table 8; however, there are three significant negative 
coefficients in the basic  (Part  1) regression,  but they are not 
significant when the lagged dependent variable is entered.  With 
the distributed lag,  almost all the coefficients  are positive, but 
unlike in Table 7  with a single exception they are not 
significant. 
As for Virginia, the two alterative measures suggest that 
the state’s  law had little or no impact on delay.  This is the 
same result as seen in Tables 5 and 7. 
The control variables in Tables 4 and 6 are worth a mention 
(these  variables are not shown in Tables 5 and 7  because their 
coefficients are very similar to those in the regressions in 
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associated with more delay, apparently because larger civil 
caseloads stretch court resources.  The coefficients on the judge 
variable are always negative, significant in the backlog ratio 
regressions but not when the number of pending cases is the 
dependent variable.  That more judges reduce delay is no surprise. 
The apparent impact of criminal filings varies greatly,  but 
the coefficients  are probably misleading in that they do not 
suggest that filings have a direct impact on delay.  In the 
backlog ratio regressions, the coefficient is significant and 
negative.  A likely explanation is that more filings are related 
to more dispositions, and dispositions are the denominator of the 
backlog ratio variable. 
relationship.  When the dependent variable is pending cases, the 
coefficient on the filing variable is always positive with very 
large t-ratios.  Here, clearly,  more filings mean more cases in 
This produces a spurious negative 
e 
the pipeline awaiting attention from the court.  This does not 
mean that the court takes longer to decide the cases just because 
more cases are filed. 
Impact of Determinate Sentencinq Laws on Trials and Pleas 
There is very little evidence that determinate sentencing 
laws affect overall trial rates (here  combining jury and non-jury 
trials).  Table 9  gives some slight indication that the laws,  when 
represented by a step dummy,  might increase trial rates.  The 
coefficients are positive throughout,  but they are significant 
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due to autocorrelation.  In Table 10 the individual state law 
dummies again are mostly positive in the basic regressions,  but 
with the lagged dependent variable there is some suggestion that 
the California and Illinois laws reduced the number of trials. 
The same pattern is found in Tables 11 and 12 when the laws are 
represented by distributed lags. 
The picture changes when the dependent variable is jury 
trials.  In Table 13 the step dummy coefficient is negative, 
significant when the dependent variable is the number of trials, 
but not significant for trial rates.  With the distributed lag, 
the aggregate coefficients are always negative and significant, 
with sizeable t-ratios (Table  15).  With the step dummy,  Virginia 
has the largest impact (Table  141, and it probably drives the 
results with the aggregate law variable (Table 13).  With the 
distributed lag, however, the laws also reduce jury trial rates in  -0 
California, North Carolina, and perhaps Illinois.  On the other 
hand, there is substantial evidence that the laws increase trial 
rates in Washington. 
The impact on Virginia jury trials was substantiated by the 
two alternate trial measure available in this study.  The first 
measure is the number of jury days during the years (one  jury day 
is a day in which a jury sits; there an be several juries sitting 
in one day).  When this variable is substituted for the jury trial 
rate in Virginia the coefficients on the Virginia law variable on 
the step dummy are  -.367  (t =  7.211) in the basic regression and 
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distributed lag, the coefficients  are  -.593 (t =  6.847)  and -.351 
(t =  4.567),  respectively.  The second measure is the number of 
1) 
juries impaneled during a year.  The corresponding results are 
-.454 (t =  7.277) and -.282  (4.857)  with the step dummy, and -.789 
(t =  7.799) and -.484 (5.084)  with the distributed lag variable. 
zzzz  (These  regressions are the same as those in Tables 14 and 16 
except that for Virginia the number of juries impaneled is 
substituted for the jury trial rate, and for the other states the 
dependent variable remains the jury trial rate.) 
The likely reasons for the strong impact in Virginia, as 
discussed earlier, have to do with the nearly unique use of jury 
sentencing in the state.  Defendants avoided jury trials after the 
law because many jurors remember the situation under the earlier 
indeterminate sentence law when defendants served terms much 
shorter than stated in the sentence,  and counsel were not allowed 
. 
to tell jurors that under the determinate sentencing law 
defendants must serve almost the full sentence length.  Also, a 
law passed soon after the determinate sentencing law allowed 
jurors to see defendant's record during the sentencing phase. 
These might not be the complete reasons for the impact of 
the Virginia law on jury trials, however.  The California and 
North Carolina laws also reduce jury trials, and whatever reasons 
lay behind these effects might also apply to Virginia. 
The final regressions deal with guilty pleas, for which we 
have data from four states (Tables  17 to 20).  Contrary to 
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@  declined after the laws.  The coefficients are consistently 
negative.  Using the aggregate law variable, both in its step and 
distributed lag forms, the impact is highly significant in the 
basic regression,  but usually not significant when lagged 
dependent variables are entered.  The overall impression from 
Tables 18 and 20 is that there is not much difference between the 
impacts in the four states.  This result is the opposite of what 
one would expect given the decline in jury trials after the laws; 
that decline,  apparently,  does not result from a switch to more 
plea dispositions.  The implication is that the total number of 
dispositions on the merits (as  opposed to, for example, 
dismissals) declines after the determinate sentencing laws.  This 
suggests that further research should be done to determine if the 
determinate sentencing laws are followed by more dismissals and 
other non-merit  dispositions. 
-0 
The final topic is the control variables in the trial and 
plea regressions.  The lagged versions of civil filings and 
judgeships proved to be far more important than the current-year 
versions, so only the former are entered.  Both the current and 
lagged criminal filing variables are important, at least in the 
basic regressions. 
Civil filing volume generally has a negative impact on the 
three rate variables (trial  rates, jury trial rates, and guilty 
plea rates).  Most civil filing coefficients are also negative 
when the dependent variable is the number of trials, jury trials, 
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in a year forces judges to spend more time on civil proceedings in 
the next year as the civil cases progress, such that they more 
likely to put off criminal trials and less likely to pressure the 
prosecution and defense into complete plea negotiations.  In a 
similar manner more judges lead to more trials, jury and total, 
but in the next year rather than in the year that the judgeships 
increase.  The reason for the lag is probably that the additional 
judges push cases through the earlier stages more quickly, and it 
takes some time for the cases to become ready for trial. 
0 
Judgeships apparently have little impact on  plea volume; there are 
significance negative coefficients in the basic regression for 
plea rates,  with both the step and distributed lag variables, but 
these become far from significant when lagged dependent variables 
.a  are entered. 
Criminal filings are negative and highly significant in the 
trial rate regressions, and positive and highly significant when 
the dependent variable is the number of  trials (Tables  9,  11, 13, 
and 15).  This is true for both total trials and jury trials.  The 
reasons for the contrasting results are probably similar to those 
for the impact of criminal filings on criminal backlogs.  More 
filings lead to more dispositions,  and dispositions are the 
denominator of the trial rate variable.  On the other hand, more 
dispositions imply more trials unless the trial rate changes 
dramatically.  Criminal filings have an extremely strong impact on 
the number of  guilty pleas (Tables 17 and 19) for a similar 
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little impact on guilty plea rates, apparently because their 
impact on pleas and total dispositions are roughly the same, again 
because most dispositions are pleas. 
@ 
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There is strong evidence that determinate sentencing laws 
increase court delay.  It takes some time for the impact to occur. 
The impact is slight when the law is represented by a step dummy 
(zero  before the law and one afterwards), but the impact is clear 
and substantial when using a distributed lag variable (this  models 
a slow increase in the law's  impact, leveling off after six 
years).  There is evidence of such impacts in California, 
Connecticut,  New Mexico, and North Carolina, but not in Illinois 
and Virginia. 
The laws are generally followed by declines in jury trial 
rates,  with a much stronger impact found with the distributed lag 
variable than with the step dummy.  The largest immediate impact 
(that is,  with the step dummy) occurred in Virginia.  Large 
gradual impacts (that is, using the distributed lag variable) 
occurred in California and North Carolina, as well as Virginia. 
On the other hand, it appears that the law caused jury trials to 
increase in Washington. 
This impact is limited to jury trials.  When the dependent 
variable is all trials,  non-jury  as well as jury, there is little 
evidence that the laws increase or reduce trials.  The decline in 
jury trials is not due to a corresponding increase in guilty 
pleas.  The laws are actually associated with fewer guilty pleas, 
with a stronger impact seen when the distributed lag variable is 
used. 
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Characteristics of States Studied 
3 
California  (1) 
Connect  i  cut  ( 1  ) 
Illinois  (2) 
New Mexico  (3) 
North Carolina  (1) 
Virginia  (4) 
Washington 
Effective 
Date of 
D.S.  Law 
7-1-77 
7-1-81 
2-1-78 
7-1-79 
7-1-81 
1-1-95 
7-1-84 
Felony  Number 
Court  of Court 
Units 
Superior  58 
Superior  11 
Circuit  20 
District  13 
Superior  30 . 
Circuit  31 
Superior  29 
Data 
Start  End 
1975  1998 
1979  1998 
1971  1995 
1974  1996 
1976  1996 
1978  1999 
1982  1999 
Notes - 
(1)  Data at time the of the law are for fiscal year starting July 
1.  North Carolina data are annual before 1979. 
(2)  Illinois data start in 1976 for pending case data, and end in 
1989 for trial data.  Chicago is excluded. 
(3) New Mexico shifted from calendar year in 1981, and there are 
no calendar or fiscal year 1980 data.  Also, 1995 data are not 
available. 
(4)  Virginia pending case data start in 1984.  :a 
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Relationships Between the Backloq Ratio and Other Delay Measures 
Correlation 
coefficient 
Connecticut 
pending cases per capita  -36 
median age active pending cases  .48 
defendants in pre-trial detention 
backlog index with active cases  -93 
-  for over 6  months  .49 
-  for over 12 months  -46 
Reqressions 
basic  w/trends 
coef.  t  coef.  t 
.43  7.62  .47  7.81 
.28  5.99  .12  2.54 
.78  38.98  -77  35.54 
.53  6.62  .34  3.94 
-69  5.23  -47  3.27 
I1  1  inois 
pending cases per capita  .60  .85  28.94  .44  13.37 
%  of cases pending 1+ year (79-92)  .59  -24  6.43  .15  3.83 
North Carolina 
pending cases per capita  .68 
%  of cases pending over 4  mo.  (78)  .59 
%  of cases pending over 6  mo.  .55 
mean age of pending cases (78)  .57 
%  of  cases disposed over 4  mo.  (78)  .64 
%  of cases disposed over 6  mo.  (77)  .65 
median age of pending cases (79)  .61 
mean age of disposed cases (78)  .66 
median age of disposed cases (79)  .63 
.63  29.52 
.42  10.91 
.27  9.67 
.48  11.52 
.36  12.60 
.47  10.07 
.47  11.81 
.64  11.95 
.62  11.54 
.a3  37.03 
.32  7.63 
.21  7.20 
.37  6.49 
.30  8.12 
.37  7.44 
-31  6.65 
-47  6.72 
-41  5.64 
Virqinia 
pending cases per capita  .76  .46  19.98  .89  16.88 
'i;  of cases disposed over 5  mo.  .49  .15  4.95  .05  1.14 
%  of cases disposed over 9  mo.  .40  .15  5.00  .04  .96 
Note -  The alternate delay measures are available for the same years as 
the backlog index,  except that some series start later (as  indicated in 
parentheses).  All correlations are significant to the .001 level.  In 
the regressions the backlog ratio is the dependent variable, and the 
coefficient is for the alternate delay measure entered as an 
independent variable.  The regressions also contain court unit dummies, 
and the regressions with trends have separate trend variables for each 
unit.  The variables are logged.  In  Virginia delay increased in most 
circuits during the period of the study. 
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Relationships Between Jury Trial Rates 
and Alternate Jury Trial Measures 
Correlation  Reqressions 
coefficient  basic  w/trends 
coef.  t  coef.  t 
Virqinia 
number of juries empaneled (84) 
number of jury days 
-88  1.38  25.16  1.32  20.11 
.85  1.06  23.92  1.08  22.33 
..  Note -  The jury trial rate is compared to the alternate variables in 
the same manner as alternate delay measures are compared to the backlog 
index in the prior table.  The number of juries empaneled and number of 
jury days are divided by dispositions. 
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-1  ..  .. 
The Impact of Determinate Sentencinq Laws on Delay 
Usinq an Aqqreqate Law Variable 
1) Without Laqqed Dependent Variable 
Backloq Rat  io  Pendins Cases 
coef.  t  coef.  t 
D.S.  Laws  0.045  0.721  0.102  2.370 
Ci. Filing  0.154  2.978  0.112  3.195 
Cr. Filing  -0.118  -2.917  0.536  18.943 
Judges  -1.083  -3.573  -0.335  -1.570 
Observations  2863 
Degrees of Fr.  2689 
Ad].  R-Sqr.  -76 
Durbin-  Wat  son  1.29 
3035 
2855 
.90 
1.16 
2)  With Laqqed DeDendent Variable 
. Backloq Ratio  Pendinq Cases 
coef.  t  coef.  t 
D.S.  Laws  0.049  0.781  0.058  1.428 
Ci. Filing  0.135  .  2.759  0.088  2.752 
Cr. Filing  -0.089  -2.324  0.386  14.667 
Lagged DV  0.395  21.704  0.440  26.587 
Judges  -0.667  -2.240  -0.330  -1.661 
Observations  2679 
Degrees of Fr.  2505 
Ad].  R-Sqr.  .80 
2874 
2693 
.93 
Notes -  The analysis also includes fixed effects (dummy 
variables for each court unit and each year) and state 
trends.  The backlog ratio is the number of pending cases 
divided by dispositions.  The pending case dependent 
variable, as well as filings and judges, are divided by the 
population of the court district.  The variables are logged. 
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The Impact of Determinate Sentencinq Laws on Delay 
Usinq an Individual State Law Variables 
1) Without Laqqed Dependent Variable 
Backloq Ratio 
coef.  t 
California  0.381  3.296 
Connecticut  -0.222  -1.624 
Illinois  -0.229  -1.656 
New Mexico  0.206  1.396 
N. Carolina  0.020  0.217 
Virginia  0.053  0.416 
F-Value  5.87  (-0001) 
2)  With Laqqed DeDendent Variable 
Backloq Ratio 
coef.  t 
California  0.098  0.569 
Connecticut  -0.198  -1.424 
I11  inois  -0.311  -1.595 
New Mexico  0.128  0.788 
N. Carolina  0.094  1.091 
Virginia  0.109  0.900 
F-Value  2.56  (.02) 
Pendinq Cases 
coef.  t 
0.355  4.985 
-0.088  -0.897 
-0.075  -0.821 
0.237  2.258 
0.771  0.051 
0.050  0.549 
7.19  (.0001) 
Pendinq Cases 
coef.  t 
0.141  1.860 
-0.097  -1.006 
-0.142  -1.456 
0.130  1.364 
0.072  1.220 
0.090  1.067 
2.59  (.02) 
Notes -  These regressions are the same as those in the 
previous table except that there is a separate law variable 
for each state.  Jury trial data are not available for 
Connecticut and New Mexico.  The F-Value  indicates whether 
the five law variables as a group are significant.  The 
number in parentheses is the significance level of the F. 
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. .. 
The Impact of Determinate Sentencinq Laws on Delay 
Usins a Distributed Laq Aqqreqate Law Variable 
1) Without Laqqed Dependent Variable 
Backloq Ratio  Pendinq Cases 
coef.  t  coef.  t 
D.S.  Laws  0.321  3.300  0.291  4.451 
Ci. Filing  0.157  3.072  0.107  3.088 
Cr. Filing  -0.115  -2.845  0.539  19.096 
Judges  -1.058  -3.527  -0.337  -1.596 
Observations  2863 
Degrees of Fr.  2689 
Ad].  R-Sqr.  -76 
Durbin-Watson  1.30 
2)  With Laqqed Dependent Variable 
Backloq Ratio 
coef.  t 
.. 
D.S.  Laws  0.231  2.288 
Ci. Filing  0.138  2.847 
Cr. Filing  -0.087  -2.274 
Judges  -0.708  -2.394 
Lagged DV  0.392  21.538 
Observations  2679 
Degrees of Fr.  2505 
Ad].  R-Sqr.  .81 
3035 
2855 
-90 
1.17 
Pendinq Cases 
coef.  t 
2.857  0.180 
0.087  2.731 
0.389  14.790 
0.438  26.396 
-0.336  -1.709 
2874 
2693 
.93 
Notes -  The determinate sentencing law variable is a 
distributed lag, the sum of the current year variable and 
five lags, divided by six.  The analysis also includes fixed 
effects (dummy  variables for each court unit and each year) 
and state trends. 
cases divided by dispositions. 
variable, as well as filings and judges,  are divided by the 
population of the court district.  The variables are logged. 
The backlog ratio is the number of pending 
The pending case dependent 
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The Impact of Determinate Sentencinq Laws on Delay 
Usins Individual State Distributed Laq Law Variables 
1) Without Laqqed Dependent Variable 
Backloq Ratio  Pendinq Cases 
coef.  t  coef.  t 
California  0.610  4.770  0.460  5.400 
Connecticut  0.280  1.441  0.237  1.703 
New Mexico  0.462  2.050  0.545  3.390 
N. Carolina  0.485  3.138  0.432  4.016 
Virginia  -0.088  -0.328  0.011  0.060 
Illinois  -0.280  -1.765  -0.184  -1.665 
F  -  Value  8.67  (.0001)  10.89  ( -0001) 
2)  With Laqqed Dependent Variable 
Backloq Ratio 
coef.  t 
California  0.282  2.032 
Connecticut  0.271  1.490 
New Mexico  0.318  1.341 
N. Carolina  0.412  2.805 
Virginia  0.065  0.255 
Illinois  -0.158  -0.963 
F-Value  3.10  (.005) 
Pendinq Cases 
coef.  t 
0.202  2.447 
0.207  1.660 
-0.126  -1.205 
0.229  1.581 
0.355  3.593 
0.100  0.567 
4.25  (.0003) 
Notes -  These regressions are the same as those in the 
previous table except that there is a separate law variable 
for each state.  Backlog data are not available for 
Washington.  The F-Value indicates whether the five law 
variables as a group are significant.  The number in 
parentheses is the significance level of the F. 
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Justice.Conn. 1 
Conn. 2 
Conn. 3 
Conn. 4 
N. C. 1 
N. C. 2 
N. C.  3 
.  N. C. 4 
N. C. 5 
.  N. C. 6 
N. C. 7 
N. C. 8 
Va. 1 
Va. 2 
Coef. 
-0.117 
-0.435 
-0.036 
-0.023 
-0.289 
-0.406 
0.062 
-0.068 
-0.189 
-0.117 
-0.076 
0.028 
0.053 
-0.063 
Table 8 
Results with Alternative Delay Measures for Individual States 
Step Dummy  Distributed Laq 
Basic  With Laq DV  Basic  With Laq DV 
t  Coef  .  t  Coef  .  t  Coef.  t 
-0.845  -0.085  -0.600 
-3.148  -0.354  -2.519 
-0.270  -0.116  -0.870 
-0.172  -0.025  -0.189 
-3.045  -0.040  -0.460 
-4.156  -0.139  -1.546 
0.670  0.145  1.711 
-0.726  0.093  1.087 
-2.033  0.001  0.014 
-1.226  0.041  0.438 
-0.835  0.059  0.710 
0.306  0.119  1.298 
-0.717  -0.034  -0.424 
0.416  0.109  0.900 
0.100 
0.093 
0.125 
0.145 
0.103 
0.047 
0.305 
0.350 
0.014 
0.162 
0.183 
-0.007 
-0.370 
-0.088 
0.510 
0.475 
0.648 
0.755 
0.648 
0.305 
1.941 
2.244 
0.085 
1.044 
1.120 
-1-  764 
-0.328 
-0.049 
0.141 
0.193 
0.123 
0.116 
0.163 
0.217 
0.217 
0.254 
0.040 
0.090 
0.150 
0.165 
-0.110 
0.065 
0.759 
1.053 
0.691 
0.656 
1.052 
1.474 
1.444 
1.748 
0.269 
0.557 
1.008 
1.051 
0.255 
-0.581 
Note -  These are the coefficients on the particular state’s  determinate 
sentencing law when the alternate delay measure is substituted for the 
cklog index (for  that state only).  With the exception of that  ,a  stitution, the regressions are the same as in the previous tables for the 
backlog index regressions,  without a lagged dependent variable and with 
separate state determinate sentencing law dummies.  The alternate measures 
are as follows: 
Connecticut 
1.  Median age active pending cases 
2.  Backlog index with active cases 
3. Defendants in pre-trial detention for over 6  months 
4.  Defendants in pre-trial detention for over 12 months 
North Carolina 
1. percent of cases pending over 4  months  (78) 
2.  percent of cases pending over 6  months 
3.  percent of cases disposed over 4  months  (78) 
4.  percent of cases disposed over 6  months  (77) 
5.  mean age of pending cases (78) 
6.  median age of pending cases (79) 
7.  mean age of disposed cases (78) 
8.  median age of disposed cases (79) 
Virqinia 
1.  percent of cases disposed over 5  months 
2. percent of cases disposed over 9  months 
50 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has
not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the
author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of
Justice.Table 9 
The Impact of Determinate Sentencinq Laws on Total Trials 
Usinq an Aqqreqate Law Variable 
1) Without Laqqed Dependent Variable 
Trial Rate  Number of Trials 
coef.  t  coef.  t 
D.S.  Laws  0.086  2.713  0.057  2.268 
Cr. Filing  -0.322  -9.038  0.194  7.174 
Cr. Filing*  -0.129  -3.573  0.085  3.028 
Judges*  0.933  4.200  0.253  3.444 
Ci. Filing*  -0.092  -2.739  -0.054  -2.154 
Observations  3434 
Degrees of Fr.  3225 
Ad].  R-Sqr.  .85 
Durbin-Watson  1.16 
2)  With Laqqed Dependent Variable 
3576 
3362 
.92 
1.13 
Trial Rate  Number of Trials 
coef.  t  coef.  t 
D.S. Laws  0.035  1.183  0.024  1.021 
Cr. Filing  -0.299  -9.252  0.200  8.219 
Judges*  0.754  3.664  0.187  2.794 
Lag D.V.*  0.458  29.017  0.457  29.435 
Ci. Filing*  -0.067  -2.195  -0.036  -1.586 
Cr. Filing*  0.030  0.923  -0.031  -1.216 
Observations  3320 
Degrees of Fr.  3110 
Ad].  R-Sqr.  .87 
3549 
3244 
.94 
Notes -  *  indicates variables lagged one year.  The analysis 
also includes fixed effects (dummy  variables for each court 
unit and each year) and state trends.  The trial rate is the 
number of trials divided by dispositions.  The number of 
trials, as well as filings and judges,  are divided by the 
population of the court district.  The variables are logged. 
51 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has
not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the
author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of
Justice.Table 10 
The Impact of Determinate Sentencinq Laws on Total Trials 
With Individual State Law Variables 
1) Without Laqqed Dependent Variable 
Trial Rate  Number of Trials 
coef.  t  coef.  t 
California  0.037  0.410  -0.026  -0.374 
Connecticut  0.097  0.937  0.185  2.248 
Illinois  0.073  0.638  0.036  0.406 
N. Carolina  0.172  2.668  0.114  2.278 
Washington  0.089  1.257  0.084  1.500 
Virginia  0.038  0.639  -0.010  -0.213 
F-Value  1.76  (.lo)  2.17  (-04) 
2)  With Laqqed Dependent Variable 
Trial Rate 
coef.  t 
California  -0.424  -1.899 
Connecticut  0.095  1.043 
Illinois  -0.386  -1.666 
N. Carolina  0.066  1.139 
Virginia  0.019  0.360 
Washington  -0.002  -0.036 
F-Value  .28  (.26) 
Number of Trials 
coef.  t 
-0.448  -2.605 
0.167  2.301 
0.020  0.460 
0.022  0.403 
-0.379  -2.125 
-0.005  -0.136 
2.30  (-03) 
Notes -  These regressions are the same as those in the 
previous table except that there is a separate law variable 
for each state.  Trial data are not available for New Mexico 
The F-Value  indicates whether the six law variables as a 
group are significant.  The number in parentheses is the 
significance level of the F. 
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The Impact of Determinate Sentencinq Laws on Total Trials 
Usinq an Aqqreqate Distributed  Laq Law Variable 
1) Without Laqqed Dependent Variable 
Trial Rate  Number of Trials 
coef.  t  coef.  t 
D.S.  Laws  0.068  1.588  0.050  1.477 
Cr. Filing  -0.323  -9.062  0.193  7.129 
Cr. Filingl  -0.123  -3.394  0.089  3.175 
Judgesl  0.892  4.025  0.250  3.392 
Ci. Filing1  -0.093  -2.750  -0.055  -2.171 
Observations  3434 
Degrees of Fr.  3225 
Adj  .  R-Sqr.  -83 
Durbin-Watson  1.15 
3576 
3362 
.92 
1.13 
2) With.Laqqed  Dependent Variable 
Trial Rate  Number of Trials 
D.S.  Laws 
Ci. Filingl 
Cr. Filing 
Cr. Filingl 
Judgesl 
Lagged DV 
Observations 
Degrees of Fr. 
Ad].  R-Sqr. 
coef. 
0.010 
-0.068 
-0  * 299 
0.033 
0.732 
0.459 
3320 
3110 
.87 
t  coef.  t 
0.264  0.013  0.441 
-9.241  0.200  8.206 
3.565  0.185  2.767 
29.077  0.457  29.477 
-2.224  -0.037  -1.605 
0.994  -0.029  -1.164 
3459 
3244 
.94 
Notes -  *  indicates  variables lagged one year.  The 
determinate sentencing law variable is a distributed lag, the 
sum of the current year variable and five lags,  divided by 
six.  The analysis also includes fixed effects (dummy 
variables for each court unit and each year) and state 
trends.  The trial rate is the number of trials divided by 
dispositions.  The number of trials,  as well as filings and 
judges, are divided by the population of the court district. 
The variables are logged. 
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The Impact of Determinate Sentencinq Laws on Total Trials 
With Individual State Distributed Laq Law Variables 
1) Without Laqqed Dependent Variable 
Trial Rate  Number of Trials 
coef.  t  coef.  t 
California  -0.029  -0.356  -0.026  -0.407 
Connecticut  0.359  2.708  0.194  1.855 
N. Carolina  0.105  1.028  0.032  0.416 
Virginia  0.017  0.143  0.031  0.318 
Washington  0.235  2.055  0.167  1.858 
Illinois  -0.308  -1.949  -0.047  -0.379 
F-Value  2.53  (-02)  1.36  (.23) 
2)  With Laqqed Dependent Variable 
Trial Rate 
coef.  t 
California  -0.075  -0.913 
Connecticut  0.180  1.529 
Illinois  -0.293  -2.033 
N. Carolina  -0.005  -0.055 
Vi  rg  i  ni  a  0.020  0.181 
Washington  0.101  1.001 
F-Value  1.30  (-25) 
Number of Trials 
coef.  t 
-0.034  -0.534 
0.082  0.881 
-0.118  -1.035 
-0.043  -0.606 
0.051  0.587 
0.053  0.670 
.59  (-74) 
Notes -  These regressions are the same as those in the 
previous table except that there is a separate law variable 
for each state.  Trial data are not available for New Mexico. 
The F-Value  indicates whether the six law variables as a 
group are significant.  The number in parentheses is the 
significance level of the F. 
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The Impact of Determinate Sentencinq Laws on Jury Trials 
Usinq an Aqqreqate Law Variable 
1) Without Laqqed Dependent Variable 
Trial Rate  Number of Trials 
coef.  t  coef.  t 
D.S. Laws  -0.042  -1.316  -0.085  -3.305 
Ci. Filing1  -0.081  -2.546  -0.040  -1.651 
Cr. Filing  -0.367  -9.901  0.146  5.192 
Cr. Filing1  -0.054  -1.440  0.112  3.818 
Judgesl  0.645  2.986  0.176  2.448 
Observations  3296 
Degrees of Fr.  3099 
Ad].  R-Sqr.  .65 
Durbin-Watson  1.19 
3438 
3236 
* 72 
1.20 
2)  With Laqqed Dependent Variable 
Trial Rate  Number of  Trials 
coef.  t  coef.  t 
D.S.  Laws 
Ci. Filing1 
Cr. Filing 
Cr. Filing1 
Judgesl 
Lagged DV 
Observations 
Degrees of Fr 
Ad].  R-Sqr. 
-0.055  -1.814 
-0.059  -2.036 
-0.356  -10.449 
0.095  2.706 
0.537  2.653 
0.426  26.343 
3183 
2985 
.74 
-0.074  -2.987 
-0.033  -1.468 
0.154  5.942 
0.004  0.174 
0.142  2.128 
0.423  26.280 
3322 
3119 
.77 
Notes -  *  indicates  variables lagged one year.  The analysis 
also includes fixed effects (dummy  variables for each court 
unit and each year) and state trends.  The trial rate is the 
number of jury trials divided by dispositions.  The number of 
trials, as well as filings and judges, are divided by the 
population of the court district.  The variables are logged. 
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_.I, 
..  . 
The ImDact of Determinate Sentencinq Laws on Jury Trials 
With Individual State Law Variables 
1) Without Laqqed DeDendent Variable 
Trial Rate  Number of Trials 
coef.  t  coef.  t 
California  -0.004  -0.047  -0.076  -1.098 
I1  1  inois  0.099  0.899  0.063  0.734 
N. Carolina  0.098  1.589  0.045  0.928 
Washington  0.243  3.511  0.163  2.958 
F-Value  9.50  (.0001)  14.32  (.  0001) 
Virginia  -0.348  -5.980  -0.356  -7.692 
2) With Laqqed Dependent Variable 
:.. 
Trial Rate 
coef.  t 
California  -0.426  -1.953 
I11  inois  -0.300  -1.326 
N. Carolina  0.026  0.458 
Washington  0.114  1.661 
Virginia  -0.217  -4.158 
F-Value  5.12 (.0001) 
Number of Trials 
coef.  t 
-0.488  -2.838 
-0.327  -1.835 
-0.020  -0.445 
-0.218  -5.163 
0.103  1.856 
8.41  (.0001) 
Notes -  These regressions are the same as those in the 
previous table except that there is a separate law variable 
for each state.  Jury trial data are not available for 
Connecticut and New Mexico.  The F-Value  indicates whether 
the five law variables as a group are significant.  The 
number in parentheses is the significance level of the F. 
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The Impact of Determinate Sentencinq Laws on Jury Trials 
Usinq an Aqqreqate Distributed Laq Law Variable 
1) Without Laqqed Dependent  Variable 
Trial Rate  Number of Trials 
coef. 
D.S. Laws  -0.191 
Ci. Filing1  -0.085 
Cr. Filing  -0.366 
Cr. Filing1  -0.061 
Judgesl  0.583 
Observations  3296 
Degrees of Fr.  3099 
Ad].  R-Sqr.  .68 
Durbin-Watson  1.20 
t  coef.  t 
-4.466  -0.203  -5.958 
-2.695  -0.042  -1.749 
-9.912  0.147  5.230 
-1.638  0.102  3.497 
2.723  0.172  2.404 
2)  With Laqqed Dependent Variable 
Trial Rate 
D.S. Laws  a 
coef.  t 
-0.142  -3.584 
Ci. Filing1  -0.063  -2.170 
Cr. Filing  -0.355  -10.444 
Cr. Filing1  0.086  2.477 
Judgesl  0.523  2.600 
Lagged DV  0.422  26.123 
Observations  3183 
Degrees of Fr.  2985 
Adj  .  R-Sqr.  .74 
3438 
3236 
.72 
1.20 
Number of Trials 
coef.  t 
-0.136  -4.218 
-0.035  -1.558 
0.155  5.969 
0.144  2.156 
0.418  25.901 
-0.001  -0.050 
3322 
3119 
.77 
Notes -  *  indicates variables lagged one year.  The 
determinate sentencing law variable is a distributed lag, the 
sum of the current year variable and five lags,  divided by 
six.  The analysis also includes fixed effects (dummy 
variables for each court unit and each year) and state 
trends.  The trial rate is the number of jury trials divided 
by dispositions.  The number of trials,  as well as filings 
and judges,  are divided by the population of the court 
district.  The variables are logged. 
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The Impact of Determinate Sentencinq Laws on Jurv Trials 
with Individual State Distributed Laq Law Variables 
1) Without Laqqed Dependent Variable 
Trial Rate  Number of Trials 
coef.  t  coef.  t 
California  -0.276  -3.440  -0.259  -4.118 
Illinois  -0.292  -1.907  -0.043  -0.355 
N. Carolina  -0.107  -1.088  -0.167  -2.174 
Virginia  -0.579  -4.813  -0.531  -5.576 
Washington  0.410  3.730  0.262  3.000 
F-Value  11.58  ( .0001)  15.48  ( .0001) 
2)  With Laqqed Dependent Variable 
Trial Rate 
coef.  t 
California  -0.250  -3.070 
I11  inois  -0.248  -1.749 
N. Carolina  -0.136  -1.508 
Virginia  -0.306  -2.800 
Washington  0.201  2.028 
F-Value  5.81 (-0001) 
Number of Trials 
coef.  t 
-0.200  -3.091 
-0.075  -0.656 
-0.173  -2.414 
-0.269  -3.060 
0.122  1.526 
6.63  (.0001) 
Notes -  These regressions are the same as those in the 
previous table except that there is a separate law variable 
for each state.  Jury trial data are not available for 
Connecticut and New Mexico.  The F-Value indicates whether 
the five law variables as a group are significant.  The 
number in parentheses is the significance level of the F. 
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The Impact of Determinate Sentencinq Laws on Guilty Pleas 
Usinq an Aqqreqate Law Variable  a 
..  -'. . 
c  .  ." 
1) Without Laqqed Dependent Variable 
Plea Rate  Number of Pleas 
coef.  t  coef.  t 
D.S. Laws  -0.110  -4.470  -0.105  -3.701 
Ci. Filing1  -0.025  -1.243  0.014  0.626 
Cr. Filing  0.000  0.031  0.663  25.812 
Cr. Filing1  -0.028  -1.205  0.185  6.927 
Judgesl  -0.428  -3.066  -0.048  -0.298 
Observations  2895 
Degrees of Fr.  2728 
Durbin-Watson  .81 
Ad].  R-Sqr.  ,73 
2) With Laqqed Dependent Variable 
D.S.  Laws 
Ci. Filing1 
Cr. Filing 
Cr. Filing1 
Judgesl 
Lagged DV 
c  <  .+ 
Observations 
Degrees of Fr. 
Ad].  R-Sqr. 
Plea Rate 
coef.  t 
-0.035  -1.736 
0.005  0.329 
0.008  0.460 
-0.037  -1.939 
-0.068  -0.622 
0.623  42.253 
2861 
2693 
.84 
2962 
2735 
.87 
.94 
Number of Pleas 
coef.  t 
-0.039  -1.560 
0.003  0.159 
0.648  30.122 
0.016  0.123 
0.550  35.062 
-0.235  -9.233 
2871 
2703 
.91 
Notes -  *  indicates variables lagged one year.  The analysis 
also includes fixed effects (dummy  variables for each court 
unit and each year) and state trends.  The guilty plea rate 
is the number of guilty pleas divided by dispositions.  The 
number of guilty pleas, as well as filings and judges, are 
divided by the population of the court district.  The 
variables are logged. 
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The Impact of Determinate Sentencinq Laws on Guilty Pleas 
With Individual State Law Variables 
1) Without Laqqed Dependent Variable 
Plea Rate  Number of Pleas 
coef  .  t  coef.  t 
California  -0.146  -2.603  -0.146  -2.230 
I  1  1  inoi  s  -0.218  -3.359  -0.048  -0.647 
N. Carolina  -0.071  -1.841  -0.071  -1.587 
Virginia  -0.127  -3.373  -0.125  -2.846 
F-Value  6.24  (-0001)  4.39  (.002) 
2) With Laqqed Dependent Variable 
Plea Rate  Number of Pleas 
coef.  t  coef.  t 
California  -0.160  -1.349  -0.100  -0.678 
Illinois  -0.246  -2.031  -0.102  -0.680 
N. Carolina  -0.057  -1.841  -0.064  -1.683 
Virginia  -0.020  -0.693  -0.016  -0.451 
F-Value  2.53  (.04)  .81 (.52) 
Notes -  These regressions are the same as those in the 
previous table except that there is a separate law variable 
for each state.  Guilty plea data are not available for 
Connecticut, New Mexico, and Washington.  The F-Value 
indicates whether the four law variables as a group are 
significant.  The number in parentheses is the significance 
level of the F. 
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a 
The Impact of Determinate Sentencinq Laws on Guilty Pleas 
Usincr an Aqsresate Distributed Laq Law Variable 
1) Without Laqqed Dependent Variable 
Plea Rate  Number of Pleas 
coef.  t  coef.  t 
D.S.  Laws  -0.225  -6.884  -0.180  -4.737 
Ci. Filing1  -0.022  -1.100  0.017  0.759 
Cr. Filing  0.006  0.262  0.667  25.992 
Cr. Filing1  -0.041  -1.772  0.174  6.524 
Judgesl  -0.446  -3.238  -0.045  -0.285 
Observations  2985 
Degrees of Fr.  2728 
Durbin-Watson  .81 
Ad].  R-Sqr.  .73 
2)  With Laqqed Dependent Variable 
2902 
2735 
.87 
.95 
Plea Rate  Number of Pleas 
coef.  t  coef.  t 
D.S.  Laws  -0.073'  -2.688  -0.051  -1.509 
Ci. Filing1  0.005  0.349  0.003  0.207 
Cr. Filing  0.011  0.582  0.649  30.124 
Judgesl  -0.072  -0.661  0.027  0.202 
Lagged DV  0.620  41.808  0.549  34.878 
Cr. Filing1  -0.042  -2.186  -0.238  -9.367 
Observations  2861 
Degrees of Fr.  2693 
Ad].  R-Sqr.  .85 
2871 
2703 
.91 
Notes -  *  indicates variables lagged one year.  The 
determinate sentencing law variable is a distributed lag, the 
sum of the current year variable and five lags, divided by 
six.  The analysis also includes fixed effects (dummy 
variables for each court unit and each year) and state 
trends.  The guilty plea rate is the number of guilty pleas 
divided by dispositions.  The number of guilty pleas, as well 
as  filings and judges, are divided by the population of the 
court district.  The variables are logged. 
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The Impact of Determinate Sentencinq Laws on Guilty Pleas 
With Individual State Distributed Laq Law Variables 
1) Without Laqqed Dependent Variable 
Plea Rate  Number of Pleas 
coef.  t  coef.  t 
California  -0.241  -4.696  -0.273  -4.560 
I11  inois  -0.306  -4.789  -0.063  -0.851 
N. Carolina  -0.271  -4.349  -0.235  -3.237 
Virginia  -0.126  -1.458  -0.036  -0.364 
F-Value  12.66  ( .OOOl)  8.26  (.0001) 
2) With Laqqed Dependent Variable 
Plea Rate  Number of Pleas 
coef.  t  .coef.  t 
California  -0.099  -2.198  -0.089  -1.595 
I11  inois  -0.125  -2.320  -0.049  -0.736 
N. Carolina  -0.121  -2.444  -0.115  -1.867 
: I. 
Virginia  0.013  0.191  0.048  0.578 
F-Value  2.49 (.04)  1.16  (-32) 
Notes -  These regressions are the same as those in the 
previous table except that there is a separate law variable 
for each state.  Guilty plea data are not available for 
Connecticut,  New Mexico, and Washington.  The F-Value 
indicates whether the four law variables as a group are 
significant.  The number in parentheses is the significance 
level of the F. 
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The following are descriptions of courts, criminal procedures, 
case statistics, and procedures for gathering statistics in the 
seven states studied.  The emphasis is on the period around the 
time that determinate sentencing laws were enacted.  The major 
sources of information  are the state court annual reports (which 
are cited with the year, an aR"  , and the page), statutes, 
interviews with court administrative personnel conducted in each 
state, and secondary literature  when available. 
CALIFORNIA 
OUTLINE OF COURT STRUCTURE AND PROCEDURES 
The Superior Courts, as general jurisdiction courts, have 
exclusive jurisdiction over felcnies.  There is a Superior Court 
for each county.  The Municipal and Justice Courts are the limited 
jurisdiction courts for judicial districts with over and under 
40,000  population, respectively.  The two have the same 
jurisdiction,  which includes misdemeanor cases and civil cases 
involving up to a monetary limit. 
Police and then prosecutor screening is common (Boland  and 
Sones, 111,  125); so a large portion of the arrests do not become 
court filings or are screened out in the early stages. 
Criminal cases are filed initially in the Municipal Court, and 
all offenses triable in the Superior Court -  i.e.,  felonies -.  must 
be brought there by indictment or information (PenC.  Sec. 737). 
As a practical matter indictments are seldom used.  A preliminary 
examination is required in the Municipal Court before bind over, 
unless waived  (PenC.  Sec. 738).  Typically, there are extensive 
plea negotiations in the Municipal Court prior to the preliminary 
hearing stage,  and plea agreements are reached in many, of not 
most, felonies (see  Boland and Sones pp.112, 125).  If the plea is 
to a misdemeanor, it can be taken in the Municipal Court; if to a 
felony,  only the Superior court can accept the plea and the case 
is certified to the Superior Court for taking the plea and 
sentencing.  Beginning January 1, 1983,  Municipal court judges, 
designated as Superior Court judges by the Chief Justice,  have 
been taking pleas and sentencing in felony cases if the parties 
consent (see  below).  Approximately half of the felony filings in 
the Municipal court are disposed of there by dismissal or 
conviction of a misdemeanor. 
in the plea bargaining process (Ackley  p. 40).  The pleas specify 
a punishment, and the defendant cannot be given a greater 
punishment if the judge accepts the plea. 
Courts.  Final acceptance of bargains reached in the Municipal 
Section 1192.5, enacted in 1970,  mandates judicial involvement 
Plea bargaining takes place in both the Municipal and Superior 
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are often entered in the Municipal Court.  The Municipal court may 
l1acceptl1  the plea, and the preliminary hearing is not held.  The 
municipal judge typically does not closely review the merits of 
the plea, especially since the probation report usually does not 
arrive until the case is in the Superior court.  If the Superior 
Court does not accept the plea arrived at below, the case must be 
sent back to the Municipal Court for a preliminary hearing (Ackley 
p. 46). 
In Santa Clara, Superior Court judges review municipal court 
cases before reaching preliminary hearing and try to arrange a 
settlement making the preliminary hearing unnecessary.  Here the 
Superior court judges take pleas and sentence in the Municipal 
Court. 
Various district attorneys have discouraged or banned plea 
bargaining, e.g. Fresno in 1974 or 1975  (75R12).  Proposition 8, 
approved June 8, 1982, provides that plea bargaining is prohibited 
in serious felony cases, as well as in driving-under-the-influence 
cases,  unless there is insufficient evidence to prove the people's 
case, testimony of a material witness cannot be obtained,  or the 
reduction would not result in a substantial change in sentence. 
The measure lists 25 felonies that are serious felonies (PenC. 
Sec. 1192.7).  The law also permits "enhancements"  for prior 
convictions -  five years for each llprior.tl  This, it has been 
alleged, gives the prosecutor more power in plea bargaining, 
because he  or she can agree to drop one or more "priors"  in 
return for a guilty plea  (Brown  p. 14).  Proposition 8 applies 
only to cases in Superior Court, thus prompting more pleas before 
the preliminary hearing  (Brown  p. 14). 
prisoners in custody (PenC.  Sec. 1048). 
-0 
When scheduling cases for trial, priority is given to 
-.. 
JUDGES 
In 1986 there were 687 Superior Court judgeships,  varying 
between one judge in 17 small counties and 224 in Los Angles. The 
judges are elected for eight year terms. 
court  (Const,  Art VI, Sec. 61, and such assignments, as well as 
use of retired judges, are common  (see  Rule 245.5, effective 
January 1, 1983).  Several of the larger courts make extensive use 
of referees and commissioners,  and there is limited use of lawyers 
as temporary judges. 
The chief justice is authorized to assign judges from court to 
DELAY  REDUCTION EFFORTS AND  OTHER CHANGES AFFECTING DELAY 
Speedy Trial Law. 
1382).  Legislation in 1982 extended the time that the defendant 
must be brought to trial anew from 10 to 60 days when the 
defendant fails to appear for trial.  The action is dismissed if 
the case is not tried within 60 days of the indictment or 
information.  There is an exception if the case is sent for trial 
beyond the 60 days with the defendants express or implied consent. 
The California speedy trial law was enacted in 1959  (PenC  Sec 
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Dismissal of a case is a bar to further prosecution (PenC.  Sec 
1387;  George, p. 120). 
The time limit can be extended beyond 60 days if good the 
defendant agrees or if good cause is shown by the prosecutor. 
According to officials in the Administrative Office of the Courts 
(AOC)  trial courts often give preference to cases approaching the 
60 day limit.  But the defendants frequently waive the 
requirement.  The good cause exception is rather strictly  applied 
(George,  p. 123ff.).  Court congestion, for example, is not 
considered good cause.  In 1980, the Supreme Court in Owens v. 
Superior Court, 28 Cal.3rd 238, 248.-52 (1980)  said that delays 
caused by the defendant are not to be deducted from the 60 day 
computation  period (George,  p. 122). 
Other Delay Reduction Efforts 
court management rules for both criminal and civil cases.  For 
criminal cases,  Rules 227.1 to 227.10: 
1) permits courts with three or more judges to establish a 
criminal division and to designate a supervision judge for the 
division, 
division, 
be set within 60 days after the information is filed, 
pretrial motion hearings at the time of arraignment, 
before the pre-trial  motion hearing, 
days before the trial date, 
proof that "the  ends of justicell require them, 
the criminal court system, 
when a guilty plea is entered in the Municipal court, 
procedures for facilitate disposition of cases before preliminary 
hearings; these procedures may include using superior court judges 
as magistrates to conduct readiness conferences before the 
preliminary hearings. 
recommend that courts use the master calendar system and that they 
dispose of pretrial motions before the readiness conference. 
(Court  with three or more judges must use the master calendar for 
civil cases.  Rule 224.) 
was substantially amended to tighten continuance policy. The rule 
required that notice of a continuance be filed with all parties, 
and the DA and defense attorney must notify the witnesses.  The 
change also specified that stipulation of the parties does not 
Effective January 1,  1995 the Judicial Council adopted trial 
2) specify the duties of the supervising judge of the criminal 
3) specify time limits for criminal proceedings; trials must 
4) require setting dates for trial, readiness conferences, and 
5) require that pretrial motions be filed at least 10 days 
6) require that the readiness conference be held within 14 
7) permit continuances  only if the party gives an affirmative 
8) require regular meetings between judges and others about 
9) direct magistrates to set sentencing date in Superior Court 
10) direct that courts (with  over three judges) adopt 
Also, Rule 10 of the Standards of Judicial Administration 
Continuance Policy.  Effective January 1,  1986, PenC. Sec.1050 
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(see  George,  pp. 112.3 ff). 
complying with Sec. 1050 or to file a disciplinary report. 
calendar.  A 1970 survey (Fall  p. 193) of the 26 courts with at 
least three judges found that the master calendar was nearly 
always used for civil cases, and usually for criminal cases.  When 
not used for criminal cases it was usually a hybrid master 
calendar (using  individual calendar until trial date set,  then 
master calendar thereafter).  Only the Los Angles court used an 
individual calendar system for criminal cases, and that was an 
experiment apparently not continued.  Three courts had hybrid: 
San Luis Obispo, Contra Costa, Orange, and Sacramento (Fall  p. 
197). 
In  what was called the "El Cajontl  experiment, the Chief 
Justice authorized judges of the El Cajon Municipal court to sit 
as judges of the San Diego Superior Court starting in September 
1977.  The experiment was extended to the South Bay and San Diego 
Municipal Courts in April 1978 and to North County Municipal Court 
in 1979.  These are the four Municipal Courts feeding the San 
Diego Superior Court; in 1983 they had 8, 7, 22, and 10 judges 
respectively.  Therefore, for practical purposes the experiment 
started in  April 1978.  As described by a judicial council report 
the Superior Court authority was used mainly to accept pleas in 
felony cases and sentence.  The judges presided over a very few 
felony trials.  The experiment was favorably reviewed.  The 
Municipal court judges disposed of 2,053  Superior court criminal 
cases in 1981, or 44 percent of the Superior court caseload.  It 
Also Sec. 1050.5  permits the court to fine attorneys for not 
There may have been changes between master and individual 
0 
is estimated that the-Municipal  Court judges provided about three 
to four judge equivalents to the Superior court.  The number of 
cases calendared for trial went down sharply,  but not until 1981. 
An  evaluation by Green and Cass found that the experiment 
probably did not result in reducing case-processing  time for the 
cases subject to the experiment,  but plea taking and sentencing by 
the municipal court judges freed Superior court judges to do other 
work.  Effective January 1,  1983, the procedure was permitted in 
all courts (Court  Rule 245.5).  There is no information, 
however,concerning  how many other courts have used the procedure. 
Early Screening.  The 1985 trial court management rules 
(above) encourage judges to screen cases before the preliminary 
hearing, including screening by Superior Court judges.  This 
program is used Santa Clara, where Superior Court judges have 
commenced reviewing cases before the preliminary examination in 
Municipal Court to try to affect settlements and to save the time 
and expense of a preliminary hearing.  If a plea is agreed upon, 
the Superior Court judge takes the plea and sentence with little 
delay.  (This  delay reduction effort is not appropriate for 
evaluation here because it takes place in the Municipal court.) 
requires that, by July 1987, the Judicial Council adopt standards 
Time Standards.  The Trial Court Delay Reduction Act of 1986 
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68603). 
The determinate sentencing law was effective for crimes 
committed after June 30, 1977.  The law changed sentencing from 
extreme indeterminacy to set sentences (but  with time off-for  good 
behavior) with enhancements, such as for use of firearms and for 
prior convictions.  The statute took effect gradually in FY 1978 
as more defendants processed had committed crimes after the 
effective date of the law.  In  practice in FY 1978 about half the 
convictions fell under the law (78R4).  The law was amended, 
applying to crimes committed after January 1, 1979, to increase 
the sentences for many types of crime (80R6). 
The Judicial Counsel is required to report each year on the 
impact of the sentencing law, and it has claimed that the 
sentencing law is related to a decline in the trial rate to an 
increase in guilty pleas; and this in turn is credited with 
reducing delay in criminal cases (85R55).  Since the law, trial 
dispositions have declined from 17 to 8 percent of total 
dispositions.  The annual report states that, although the law may 
increase time to disposition somewhat because sentencing 
procedures take longer, the increase in guilty pleas has had the 
overall effect of reducing time (85R55).  The overall conviction 
rate -  guilty pleas plus trial convictions -  has increased,  but 
the percent convicted at trial has not changed much  (85R55).  The 
percentage of convictions resulting in imprisonment has increased 
substantially, but the average sentence length for  various crimes 
has remained rather steady (85R57). 
Before the determinate sentencing law, there was a low minimum 
and very high maximum prison term; and plea bargaining was largely 
aimed at determining whether or not the defendant would be 
committed to prison (Utz  p. xiii).  The determinate sentencing law 
broadens the scope of plea negotiations by permitting more 
specific agreements affecting the length of sentence. 
.a 
DATA GATHERING 
county.  1) The Calendar report gives information about pending 
cases and about some aspects of delay.  2) The Summary Report 
gives the number of filings, trials, and dispositions.  3) The 
Report of Assistance gives information about extra judges, 
commissioners, and referees serving.  The Calendar report has not 
changed from 1968 through at least 1986.  FY 1976 is the first 
year for data on guilty pleas, trial outcome,  and for all 
practical purposes the number of trials.  As of the mid-1980s  most 
courts still compiled the data manually, and only a dozen or so 
have computers. 
can be practically gathered.  The old monthly summary reports are 
on microfiche, and the calendar reports are in storage; the data 
not published has not been compiled into annual data. 
through consistency checks.  Every six  months a computer program 
Data are obtained from three monthly reports sent in by each 
The data published in the annual report are the only data that 
The AOC does not independently check the data obtained,  except 
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is far out of line (by  a set number of standard deviations), and 
the AOC asks courts where this occurs to check their numbers. 
Each month the computer looks at the two year monthly average,  and 
if the figure is way out of line, the AOC will ask the court to 
check.  Also, each year the AOC publishes a report showing five 
year trends for each county.  The judges are asked to check the 
data for their courts,  and they sometimes notice mistakes. 
The AOC also compares Municipal and Justice statistics to 
Superior court figures.  The number of cases bound over plus 
guilty plea  (to  felony) in the Municipal and Justice Courts should 
equal the number of filings in the Superior Court  (except  for the 
small number of grand jury cases).  The Annual Reports give this 
disposition data for Municipal Courts. 
disposition equal end pending. 
independently obtained by the Judicial Council on sentencing 
practices, and they match very closely. 
If a court requests help filling out data reports, the AOC 
will arrange to have a clerk from a nearby county visit and 
explain case counting procedures.  This happens two or three times 
a year. 
The AOC does not require that pending plus filing less 
Statistics on convictions are checked against data 
Problems with Data. 
The most important problem with the criminal data is that a 
few courts did not report guilty pleas entered in the Municipal 
Court and certified to the Superior court (see  below).  When these 
cases are not included, the courts greatly under count the number 
of dispositions and guilty pleas, and some courts, filings. 
Alamada, Fresno, Humbolt, Nevada, San Joaquin, and San Luis Obispo 
counties are deleted from the analysis for this reason.  Also, 
Humbolt County reported only 6  months data in 1986. 
number of filings is much higher than dispositions  because cases 
placed on inactive status are not counted as dispositions,but 
cases reinstated are counted as filings. 
The major problems have been in the Municipal court. Often the 
DATA ELEMENTS 
indictment,  information,  or certification  was filed (Regulations 
on Superior Court Reports, p. 10).  Separate counts in an 
accusatory pleading are not counted separately.  Filings include 
transfers from other courts; these are apparently changes of 
venue, of which there are extremely few (e.g.,  26 in 1984). 
According to the AOC staff, prosecution practices determine 
whether there is one or two cases when a defendant is charged with 
committing two separate,  but similar crimes.  In other areas too, 
prosecutors affect filing volume.  They may screen cases before 
filing for sufficient evidence, they may decided to charge cases 
as misdemeanors rather than felonies,  and they may accept pleas to 
Criminal filings are the number of defendants against whom an 
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felonies (see  especially Utz). 
by prosecutorial practices. 
Municipal courts to hear felony filings reduced to misdemeanors, 
felony filings were reduced greatly (see 85R123). 
Filing data includes felony cases were a guilty plea was 
entered in the Municipal Court and then transferred to the 
Superior Court for sentencing.  In Alameda, Fresno, and Humbolt 
Counties the filing figures for some years did not include these 
cases. 
Criminal disposition includes all cases, and inactive cases 
are not counted as dispositions until dismissed or decided. 
According to the AOC, there are few cases on prosecution diversion 
and there is no provision for suspended sentencing. 
The dispositions after trial are discussed below.  The Regulation 
on Superior Court Reports state that the categories of disposition 
before trial are:  dismissed (defendants  against whom criminal 
proceedings were dismissed), transferred to another court 
(defendants  transferred for trial in another court), and convicted 
after plea of guilty (guilty  pleas before trial starts). 
The statistics on dispositions combine the first two in the 
Ilother" category.  Disposition  before trial are before the start 
of jury selection (or  for non-jury  cases,  before opening statement 
or introduction of evidence).  In a few counties the guilty plea 
(and  disposition) figures do not include cases where guilty pleas 
were taken in the Municipal Court. 
The only published pending data are the number of criminal 
cases set for trial as of the end of the fiscal year.  The AOC 
also collects data on the total number pending and the number set 
for trial in the next 30 days, but these data are not published 
and, therefore,  not available.  The total filings, and thus the 
total pending, data include many cases in which a plea has been 
tentatively agreed upon in the Municipal Courts.  These cases are 
excluded from the number of cases set for trial.  Cases set for 
trial are those in  which the defendant pleads not guilty at the 
arraignment.  Inactive cases are removed from the number of cases 
calendared for trial, according to AOC staff, but the Regulations 
on Superior Court Reports are silent on this matter. The pending 
and disposition figures do not match: pending is in terms of cases 
calendared for trial and dispositions are in terms of all cases. 
Therefore, the backlog ratio differs from that for other states. 
There are data for both jury and non-jury  trials.  A jury 
trial starts when jury selection starts,  and a court trial starts 
when testimony or an opening statement is begun.  Statistics are 
given for contested and uncontested trials.  Contested trials are 
those where both parties have introduced evidence, and uncontested 
trials are those in which only one side presents evidence.  The 
reason for collecting separate statistics,  according to the AOC 
staff,  is that it was believed that "uncontested"  trials took less 
time.  But the "uncontestedll trials are probably real, contested 
In the early 1970's the number of filings was greatly affected 
When new legislation permitted 
Disposition data are broken down into several categories 
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and the acquittal rate is about the same for the two types of 
trials.  Also, staff at the Santa Clara court said that it was 
very hard to distinguish between contested and noncontested 
trials.  In  practice, the st-atistics  for uncontested trials are 
very erratic for many counties; so that data are not used.  Prior 
to FY 1976,  the "uncontested  trial" category was cases disposed on 
the record of the preliminary hearing, and "contested  trials" 
included cases in which only one party introduced evidence. 
Starting in 1976,  the present system was put in place, and the 
cases disposed of on the record of the preliminary hearing 
presumably became guilty pleas. 
criminal juries sworn,  given for Superior courts with 6  or more 
judges.  This is not the same as the number of jury trials, but 
can be used to check the figures. 
Guilty pleas recorded after a trial starts are counted as trials, 
not guilty pleas.  A major problem with the statistics is that a 
few courts did not record cases in which a plea was entered and 
accepted in the Municipal court, and certified to the Superior 
Court. 
record such cases as filings (and thus as guilty pleas) until 
recent years.  Also, statistical trends suggest that Humbolt 
county has not counted such cases since the early 1980s. 
The statistical reports, and the annual reports of past years, 
have a category of disposition after a trial "on  the transcript of 
the preliminary hearing."  This procedure was abolished, according 
Date are available since 1976 for the number and percent of 
A second measure of the number of  trials is the number of 
Guilty plea statistics are available beginning in 1976. 
According to the AOC Alameda and Fresno Counties did not 
to the AOC. 
criminal juries sworn in more than 60  days from indictment or 
information (but  only for Superior Courts with six or more 
judges).  For 1985,  a footnote explains the that the San Bernadino 
statistics are inconsistent (more juries sworn in over 60 days 
than total juries sworn in). 
authorized judgeships at the end of the year, the judicial 
assistance,  and the number of commissioners and referees.  The 
exact number of judgeships in each county each year can be 
obtained from the footnotes to tables, which should be used to 
adjust the figures in the tables. 
The use of extra judges (retired  and temporarily transferred 
judges) is indicated in the judicial assistance figures.  The 
Chief Justice has authority to transfer judges between districts 
temporarily and to assign retired judges.  The assignments are 
done by the Judicial Assignments Unit of the AOC, and they can be 
done to fill in for a vacancy or indisposed judge or to help the 
receiving court deal with its caseload.  Tables gives the number 
of days of assistance received and given by each court, as well as 
the net number of days (number  received less the number given) 
given to each court.  Tables also give the source of the 
assignments, which is primarily retired judges.  They also gives 
The Annual Report gives information on the number of 
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the number of days times the number of judge positions which are 
not vacant; net days are not given in the annual report and cannot 
be calculated from it).  The definition of the number of days of 
assistance was changed in January 1, 1983.  Earlier, if a judge 
worked three hours or less, a half day was recorded,  and more than 
three hours was a full day.  From 1983 the calculation is as 
follows: over 6 hours is counted as a full day;  over 4 up to 6  as 
three fourths of a day; over 2 up to 4 as a half day; 2 and under 
as a fourth of a day. 
The amount of judicial assistance is given in the number of 
days. 
year is assumed, since this seems to be the number of "days  the 
court is open" for purpose of calculations. 
reports give the days of  assistance given by commissioners, 
referees, and lawyers acting as temporary judges.  The annual 
reports count commissioners and referees as judge equivalents 
because in  almost all cases they preform functions that would 
otherwise require a judge.  For example, they can try cases as 
temporary judges (but  only if the parties agree).  A 1982 study of 
the commissioners' and referees' duties found that they operate 
approximately 70 to 80 percent of the time in the capacity of 
temporary judges, and they sit mainly in the area of family and 
juvenile law, but in some courts they regularly sit as temporary 
judges in civil and criminal cases. 
first is the "report  of  assistance" form submitted monthly by the 
courts,  and the number of days assistance is given in the annual 
reports, where data are not given for courts that make little use 
of commissioner and referees.  The number of judge equivalents can 
be obtained by dividing the days assistance by 245.  2) The actual 
number of commissioners and referees (but  not the numbers of 
lawyers used as temporary judges) is available by subtracting the 
total judicial positions  from the number of judgeships in Table 
(before  adjusting for when judgeships  were created).  This is the 
figure for the end of the FY, however,  and the number of positions 
during the year would have to be the average of that for the end 
of the year and the end of the prior year. 
Beginning with 1981 the annual reports published the number of 
"judicial  position equivalents,'I which is the number of persons 
actually available and present in the courts.  It is determined by 
adjusting the authorized number of judges to reflect vacancies, 
assistance from other courts, from full-time  and part-time 
commissioners and referees, and from temporary judges sitting by 
stipulation  of the parties.  This can be used to test the accuracy 
of measures used by 1) comparing the number, less the number of 
referees and commissioners,  to the number of judgeships, and 2) by 
comparing the number to the number of total judicial positions 
used here. 
In  all, there are two major measures of judge resources: 1) 
the total number of judgeships,  adjusted for when the judgeships 
0 
To determine the number of judge equivalents,  a 245 day 
Additional judicial resources are commissioners.  The annual 
The amount of such service is given in two sources.  1) The 
:a 
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(divided  by 245), and 2) the total judicial positions, adjusted 
for when judgeships  were created,  adding the amount of assistance 
(number  of days divided by 245) given by commissioners,  referees, 
and lawyers as temporary judges. 
FY 1976.  Conviction data are broken down into "contested"  and 
"uncontested"  trials,  which as discussed above is probably not 
meaningful distinction.  The analysis can be run with both as 
independent variables.  The data are also broken down into jury 
and nonrjury data. 
criminal cases.  Civil filings are presented separately for many 
categories.  The major civil cases can be determined by the case 
weighting system: personal injury and property damage (81), 
eminent domain (120),  and other civil complaints (117).  Total 
disposition figures are given for all these types of cases. 
The data for pending is the number awaiting trial.  It 
includes all civil cases,  not just the categories here.  Cases 
awaiting trial are cases in which the attorneys have filed at- 
issue memos, stating that the case is ready for the setting of a 
trial date; they are considered to be on the "civil  active listrt. 
This is not a very useful measure of backlog.  Attorneys file at- 
issue memos in many cases that are not ready for trial for which 
an early trial is neither desired nor anticipated.  Also, the at- 
issue memo has different meanings from court to court in terms of 
trial readiness; so attorneys time their filings based on their 
knowledge of the time frame the court follows in processing the 
filing.  Before 1968,  cases were not considered awaiting trial 
until the court gave a certificate of readiness stating that cases 
with at issue memos can be placed on the trial list. San Francisco 
did not change to counting active pending at the time of the at- 
issue memo until 1980, and practices at other courts may also 
vary.  The number on the active list went dropped greatly after 
1980, perhaps because the arbitration program in larger courts 
(see  below) took cases off of the active pending list into a list 
of cases awaiting arbitration. 
civil trials.  Here contested trials are probably the better 
measure of trials, and that is the measure used by at least one 
judicial council study (See  the 1983 Judicial Council report,  p. 
7).  This information is not broken down into jury and judge 
trial. 
by jury trial (broken  down into personal injury/property damage 
and all other proceedings). 
As for delay measures in civil cases,  the annual report has 
figures for the median time from at-issue  to trial in civil jury 
cases for the 21 courts with six or more judges.  (This 
information is collected for other counties,  but not published and 
therefore not readily available for earlier years;  also, it is 
less reliable for smaller courts since it is based on fewer 
Data concerning the outcome of trials was first collected in 
In general, the civil case data is similar to that for 
Data are available for the number of contested and uncontested 
Data are available since 1976 for the number of dispositions 
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June of each year, and it suffers from small sample sizes. 
Occasionally, the court tried no civil cases in June, resulting in 
missing data. 
A second measure of delay is civil cases is the portion of 
cases pending trial in which at-issue  memoranda were filed over a 
year ago. 
judges. 
arbitration program was begun in the large courts in July 1, 1979, 
and cases were taken off the list of cases pending trial pending 
the arbitration proceedings. 
The times from at-issue  to trial can be affected by the 
calendaring practices of the court.  The Santa Clara court took 
cases off the at-issue  list if the judge does not grant a 
continuance to the attorney and the attorney is not ready.  It is 
then placed back on the list when the attorney requests. 
courts that less freely take case off the at-issue  list would show 
longer times for cases on the at-issue  list.  Also, the court may 
determine what cases get on  the trial pending list.  According to 
Santa Clara officials, the Los Angles court does not put cases on 
the trial list when attorneys file at-issue  statements,  but rather 
asks for a certificate of readiness when the court wants to add 
cases to the list.  Finally,  as the 1983 report states (page  7) 
the median time to trial "historically lags behind other 
measurements in reflecting existing calendar conditions."  The 
Calendar Report form collects data on the time between complaint 
and trial and at issue memo to trial in cases tried  (separated  out 
0 
It is available for Superior Courts with 6 or more 
This measure was greatly affected by the fact that an 
Other 
for jury and non jury). 
except for the median figure discussed above.  In sum,  there does 
not appear to be a usable measure of delay for civil cases. 
There have been many delay-reduction  efforts for civil cases. 
For example,  amendments to the trial court management rules, 
effective January 1,  1985, added many provisions strengthening 
trial court management.  Effective July 1,  1979, courts with 10 or 
more judges must establish arbitration programs for cases 
involving $15,000  or less, and $25,000  or less in four counties 
starting in 1982.  The arbitration occurs within 90 days of  filing 
the at-issue  memo.  A study by the Judicial Council found that the 
arbitration program reduced delay in that cases pending 
arbitration are not on the list of cases pending trial, and 
therefore non-arbitration  cases reach trial earlier.  Also, some 
cases going to arbitration are settled and do not return to the 
trial list.  The median time to trial, however, did not decrease 
by the time of the Judicial Council 1983 report,  which was 
attributed to the fact that this delay measure "historically  lags" 
behind other measures.  The study also found a drop in the 
proportion of dispositions by trial, but concluded that this may 
be due to a long term trends towards fewer trial dispositions. 
The economical litigation project, which started in January 1, 
1978 and ended July 1,  1983, provided for simpler procedures in 
cases involving $25,000  or less.  Pleading were made simpler, 
discovery was restricted,  and trial procedures were simplified. 
But this information is not published,  0 
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did not reduce delay), with the exception of the discovery 
Trial Court Delay Reduction Act of 1986 contains, among other 
provisions, a requirement that the Judicial Council adapt 
standards of timely disposition (GovC.  68603), collect statistics 
concerning these standards (GovC.  686041, and establish "exemplary 
delay reduction programs" (GovC.  68606-68614). 
@  restrictions and permitting written testimony by experts.  The 
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CONNECTICUT 
OUTLINE OF COURT STRUCTURE AND  PROCEDURES 
Connecticut established a unified court system on July 1, 
1978.  All courts, except probate courts,  were consolidated into 
the Superior Court.  The court is divided into four divisions:  - 
criminal, civil, housing, and family. 
Major felony cases are tried primarily in Judicial District 
Locations, and misdemeanors and some felony cases are tried in the 
Geographical Area Locations.  Both locations are subdivisions of 
the Superior Court, and preform functions similar to those of 
general and limited jurisdiction courts,  respectively.  The 
75 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has
not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the
author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of
Justice..' 
Geographical Area locations conduct felony preliminary.  From 
court year 1979 to 1981 all Class A to Class C felony cases 
(punishable  by sentences of more than five years) were tried in 
the Judicial Districts,  while Class D felonies and other crimes 
were tried in the Geographical Areas.  Starting in 1982,  some 
Class B and C felonies were filed in the Geographical Areas in 
some parts of the state, greatly reducing the criminal caseloads 
in the Judicial Districts involved.  All Class A felonies, 
punishable by sentences of over 20 years, remain in the Judicial 
Districts. 
Civil Division of the Superior Court.  About ten percent of the 
civil cases are filed in Geographical Areas.  In addition, the 
large districts have housing courts. 
The state is divided into 12 districts for felony cases; the 
twelfth district, Stamford-Norwalk,  was permitted to hear felony 
cases starting in 1982.  Previously felony cases were heard in 
Bridgeport  (later  called the Fairfield location), and in the 
analysis the Stanford-Norwalk  and Bridgeport data are merged. 
Criminal filing, disposition, and disposition data for Danbury are 
deleted after 1994 because of  an erratic increases due to inactive 
cases.  Data for Danbury and Ansonia-Milford  are delated before 
1981 since these districts began hearing criminal cases only in 
1979.  For civil cases only three districts were split since 1979: 
Bristol and New Britain from Hartford; Meriden from New Haven; and 
Norwich from New London.  These were combined in the analysis. 
@ 
Civil cases above the small claims limit are filed in the 
JUDGES 
appellate judges, who are technically members of the Superior 
Court).  They are assigned to the different locations for six 
month rotations.  The state court administrator assigns the judges 
to the districts and to the divisions within the courts. 
can trial civil non-jury  cases and  (beginning  in 1982) can try 
civil jury cases with the consent of  the parties.  Beginning in 
early 1984 the Superior Court also has been using attorneys as 
trial referees, as discussed below. In 1983 the state initiated a 
program to have attorney magistrates hear motor vehicle 
infractions and violations.  This freed up some judge time for 
civil and criminal cases. 
In 1999 there were 170 judges in the Superior Court (excluding 
The Superior Court uses retired judges as trial referees,  who 
DELAY REDUCTION EFFORTS AND OTHER CHANGES AFFECTING DELAY 
Speedy Trial Law. 
The Connecticut speedy trial law, effective July 1,  1983, was 
established by statute, and revised by a law effective July 1, 
1985.  The legislation  directed the Superior Court to make rules. 
Earlier, the only speedy trial law required that imprisoned 
defendants, against whom there are charged for another crime,  be 
tried for that other crime within 120 days (Gen.Stat.  Sec. 54-82c) 
For defendants charged between July 1,  1983 and June 30, 1985, 
trials must begin within 18 months of the date of information, or 
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Rules 956B.  The time limit is 12 months for defendants in 
pretrial custody.  The time periods were reduced to 12 and 8 
months respectively for defendants charged after June 30, 1985. 
C. Rules 956B;  Gen.Stat. Sec 54-82m. 
1) delay resulting from other proceedings, including mental health 
proceedings, trials on other charges, and appeals;  2) delay 
resulting from unavailability of the defendant or essential 
prosecutor witnesses;  3) delay due to defendants inability to 
stand trial; 4) delay when the case is joined with another 
defendant whose time has not run; 5) time between entering a pleas 
of guilty and withdrawal of the plea; 6) delay due to continuances 
granted at the request of the defendant; 7) delay due to 
continuances requested by the prosecution if because of 
unavailability of material evidence, or if because the prosecution 
needs additional time to prepare the case and "additional  time is 
justified because of the exceptional circumstances of the case." 
The defendant may waive speedy trial rights in writing or in 
open court (Rule  956F),  and waives them if a motion is not filed 
before the start of trial.  There is a 30 day period between 
filing of a motion for dismissal and the actual dismissal 
(apparently  if the motion is not filed 30 days before the end of 
the time period, the time period is in effect extended). C. Rule 
956D.  The dismissal is with prejudice (C.  Rule 956D). 
Excludable periods, listed in Rule 956B,  include: 
Other Delay Reduction Efforts. 
of 1981 (82R15;84R13). The major feature of this effort was to 
route many of the Class B and C felony cases to the Geographic 
Areas, as described in Section 1 above.  Also additional judges 
were assigned to the criminal division. 
In the late 1970's the courts established time standards for 
Judicial District locations: one year for the urban courts 
(Bridgeport,  Hartford,  New Haven, and Waterbury), and six months 
for the remaining districts. (86R37;84R15)  According to court 
administration staff, these standards have not been changed.  They 
are used routinely to monitor the progress of courts; a report is 
issued each month showing the number of cases pending for periods 
longer then the time limit allows.  Because the time limits went 
into effect before the time covered by the present research,  they 
cannot be evaluated here. 
As for civil cases, the state started an attorney trial 
referee program in February 1984, such that attorneys tried civil 
nonjury cases (there  was no limit on the amount in controversy). 
Previously only retired judges were referees. (84R17;86R46) 
management program,  which consisted of many elements used in 
varying districts.  Examples are a fast-track  program for cases 
involving lesser amounts, summary jury trials, and use of caseflow 
coordinators. 
The state initiated a major delay reduction effort in the Fall  0 
In the mid-1980's the Superior Court also initiated a case 
77 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has
not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the
author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of
Justice.DATA 
the state court administrative office in monthly reports. The 
state court administrator does not audit the data.  The courts are 
required to count pending cases each month. The major problem with 
the data is the change in definition of active pending cases, 
discussed below.  There have been no other changes. 
The unit of count for criminal cases is the case; several 
defendants combined under one docket number are counted as one 
case.  AOC staff said there was no problem of inconsistent 
counting between diskricts. 
from the Geographic Area location. 
of active cases pending.  Approximately 65 to 70 percent of the 
pending cases are active.  According to the data forms,  the 
inactive cases are: 1. bond forfeiture,  fugitive,  2. transferred 
to other Judicial District,  and 3. other (including  appeals). 
Also, active cases do not include diversionary cases,  which are 1. 
committed (54-56d,  21a-284,  19a-386)  and 2. other (accelerated 
rehabilitation).  According to AOC staff there are very few 
diversionary cases in the Judicial District courts (but many in 
the Geographical Area courts). 
cases: those awaiting plea, those awaiting trial, and those 
awaiting sentencing.  The vast majority are awaiting trial.  In 
1984 the statistics for total pending cases no longer included 
those awaiting sentencing (which  account for 15 to 20 percent of 
the cases), but statistics for case awaiting trial are available, 
permitting consistent trend statistics for two types of active 
pending: including and not including cases awaiting sentencing. 
Statistics are available for the number of criminal cases 
disposed with trial.  A non-jury  trial occurs if a witness is 
sworn; a jury trial occurs when a jury is impaneled.  Guilty plea 
statistics are not available. 
There are several time lapse measures for criminal cases. The 
mean number of months that active cases have been pending is 
available.  But, as discussed above, the definition of  active 
pending case changed in 1984,  excluding cases awaiting sentencing. 
Thus 15 to 20 percent of the cases,  generally the longest pending, 
are not included in the measure.  The impact on the median figure 
is uncertain, but it is certainly less than if it had been the 
mean. 
Statistics are given for the number of active cases that have 
been pending 1) under 6  months, 2) 6  to 12 months, and 3) over 12 
months.  The initial point for counting time is the arraignment 
(in  the Geographic Area Locations).  This series ended in 1988. 
Data are available for the number pending at the beginning and 
end of the year according to these three time spans.  These 
figures were affected by the change in definition in pending cases 
in 1984,  but relatively few of the cases awaiting sentencing are 
in the under 6  month category.  The under 6 month category for 
Criminal caseload statistics are gathered locally and sent to 
6 
The cases are counted when bound over 
Cases are counted as disposed when sentenced. 
The court statistics include the number pending and the number 
Statistics are presented for three types of active pending 
0 
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1984 when the change was made  (this  is the number pending less 
than 6  months at the end of 1983 less the number pending at the 
beginning of 1984). 
cases, are available for confined defendants.  Unlike data for 
total pending, this series does not end and continues to 1998. 
However, because the beginning pending figures are not published, 
no adjustment could be made for the change in definition of active 
pending cases in 1984. 
'  Because judges rotate, the only available judge data is the 
state-wide  number.  It is the number of actual judgeships,  based 
on the effective data of statutes creating the judgeships. 
As for civil cases, data are published for "civil  casest1 
beginning pending, filed,  disposed,  pending, and disposed by 
trial. 
Statistics,  comparable to those for age periods of active 
ILLINOIS 
OUTLINE OF COURT STRUCTURE  AND PROCEDURE 
Courts and Jurisdiction. 
The Illinois Circuit Court is a single unified trial court. 
The 102 counties are divided into 22 circuits,  including one for 
Cook County.  All downstate circuits, except the 18th,  have two or 
more counties.  The county composition of  the circuits changed 
0 
only once since 1970; the-2lst-Circuit  was split off of the 12 in 
1984. 
The Circuit Court receives both felony and misdemeanor cases, 
and separate statistics are gathered for each. Appeals from all 
cases go to the appellate courts.  There are no appeals do novo. 
Circuit Courts have two types of judges, circuit and associate 
judges.  Circuit judges are elected  (either  county or circuit wide 
elections).  Associate judges are appointed to four year terms by 
the circuit judges, and they can hear any type of case, but in 
some courts are limited to minor cases. 
Counties with population of 35,000  or over must establish 
public defender programs.  Smaller counties can choose either 
public defender or assigned counsel, and most chose the latter. 
Felony Case Procedures. 
minor cases with complaint.  Felony prosecutions were commenced 
only by indictment after grand jury (unless  waived) until October 
1,  1975.  A preliminary examination for the purposes of 
determining probable cause, was given (or  waived) before the 
information (Comments  to Stat. Ch. 38 Sec. 111-2;  Kavanaugh & 
Jesser,  p. 283).  For crimes occurring on or after October 1, 
1975, information was permitted if preliminary hearing was held or 
waived  (Ch. 38, Sec. 111-2).  The information is filed after the 
finding of probable cause at a preliminary hearing  (Kavanaugh  & 
Felony cases are commenced with indictment or information,  and 
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Jesser).  The 1975 change was made at about the same time that the 
speedy trial law was tightened (see  below), and the two changes 
are probably related because the new speedy trial requirements 
would not be feasible given the delay caused by the grand jury 
proceedings (Kavanaugh  &  Jesser). 
preliminary hearing division of the court  (Moran,  p. 50).  At 
first appearance, defendants are informed of the charges against 
them and are advised of their rights; also, pretrial release 
status is determined.  If a felony is charged, the case proceeds 
to preliminary examination (unless  probable cause was found by 
means of a grand jury indictment).  The defendant may waive 
preliminary examination.  At arraignment (or  second appearance) 
defendants enter pleas and may waive jury trial, and counsel is 
appointed.  When guilty pleas are entered, sentencing can proceed 
immediately.  Otherwise the case proceeds to preliminary hearing 
(unless  waived, which often occurs).  Informations are filed in 
the preliminary hearing court, and the majority of criminal cases 
are terminated there when the defendant pleads guilty (Moran,  p. 
51). 
If the defendant pleads not guilty at the early stages of case 
processing, the court typically holds one or more status or 
pretrial conferences.  Judges cannot initiate plea bargaining, but 
may discuss a tentative agreement and may concur (or  conditionally 
concur) in a proposed disposition (Rule  402(d)). 
After guilty plea or trial conviction, a presentence report is 
prepared and a sentencing hearing his held.  When judges desire 
more information than is contained in the presentence report, they 
may commit defendants to the Department of Corrections for up to 
60 days after conviction for pre-sentence  evaluation.  Apparently, 
this is not done often. 
In  most courts, criminal cases are processed initially in the 
.@ 
JUDGES AND ATTORNEYS 
In 1984 Illinois had 384 Circuit judges and 321 Associate 
judges,  with 202 and 173 respectively outside of Cook County.  The 
ratio of Circuit to Associate judges varies greatly from circuit 
to circuit;  associate judges vary from 18 to 61  percent of the 
judges  . 
The statistics for the number of judges given in the annual 
reports is considerably below the number of authorized judgeships. 
The judge statistics are for December 31 of each year since 1978, 
for May 1 in 1974 to 1977, April 1 in 1973, and June 30 in 1971 to 
1973.  Before 1973 the Circuit Court judges were called circuit 
judges, associate judges, and magistrates.  The circuit and 
associate judges become IlCircuit Judgesf1  and the magistrates 
became associate judges.  The figures for judges before 1973 
include all three categories of judges,  but the breakdown between 
circuit and associate judges is not comparable to that for later 
years. 
and the associate judges are elected to 4 year terms by the 
circuit judges in the circuit.  The associate judgeships are 
Circuit judges are elected to 6  year terms by the electorate, 
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per 35,000  population,  and additional associate judgeships are 
created by the Supreme Court upon a showing of need by the Circuit 
chief judge. 
The duties of associate judges vary greatly from circuit to 
circuit; overall they are generally assigned to lesser cases, both 
civil and criminal.  Matters that can be assigned to associate 
judges are determined by court rule (Con.  Art IV sec. 8;  Rule 
295).  Supreme Court Rule 295 states that the Circuit chief judges 
assigns associate judges; hence, the chief judges determine the 
type of case associate judges hear. Originally, chief judges were 
not allowed to assign associate judges to felony trials,  but Rule 
295 was amended, effective May 28, 1975, to permit the Supreme 
Court, after a showing of need by the chief judge, to authorize 
individual associate judges to hear felony cases.  The Supreme 
Court has limited these authorizations to six months and has 
increased the number of assignments over the years. In 1984 the 
AOC granted 156 requests from downstate chief judges for 
permission to assign associate judges to felony cases.  In recent 
years, there have been assignments in all Circuits except the 6th 
Circuit.  The 19th and 20th Circuits have had the most 
assignments.  The fact that associate judges are permitted to hear 
felony cases,  however, does not mean that the chief judge actually 
assigns them many such cases.  They could be a reserve judges, 
seldom if ever needed; or their felony duties could be limited to 
felony preliminary.  On the other hand, some associate judges 
regularly trial felony cases.  A review of the assignment requests 
submitted by the chief judges in 1984 and 1985 reveled that the 
reasons given for assignment requests were usually that the 
associate judges are needed to fill in for circuit judges when the 
latter are unavailable or are assigned to another county.  Quite a 
few requests,  however, specifically state that the associate 
judges will be assigned to try felony cases.  The AOC does not 
maintain information about the actual use of associated judges in 
felony cases. 
court to another and to recall retired judges.  It regularly 
exercises this authority.  Each year four to seven circuit judges 
(and also a few retired circuit judges) are assigned to the 
Appellate Court.  In fact, a few Circuit judges are so assigned 
year after year and, thus, are actually appellate court judges. 
Also, the Supreme Court regularly assigns downstate judges to Cook 
County.  In 1984 there were 324 such assignments,  typically for 
one or two weeks.  This amounted to an additional 434 judge work 
weeks, or about 9.4 additional judges, using the 46 week work year 
standard that the AOC uses.  The total number of judge weeks 
assigned to Cook County is given in the annual reports. 
Cook County, which first calculates the "excessIf  judge manpower in 
each district and the extra judges needed in Cook County, and than 
requires assignments from the downstate counties roughly in 
proportion to the amount of excess manpower.  The excess manpower 
The Supreme Court has authority to transfer judges from one 
In 1976 the AOC established a formula for assigning judges to 
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number of judges) times the average per judge case output in the 
state (with small adjustments for geographic area and size of 
backlog).  The resulting estimates for 1976 and 1986 show that the 
assignments varied from 3 to 52 judge weeks, with the upper limit 
constituting about 7 percent of the judicial manpower of a down 
state county.  The size of the down state circuits' contributions 
were roughly the same for 1976 and 1986.  It would be possible to 
use the formula to calculate roughly proportional contribution 
(and  to estimate the actual contribution by using the total judge 
weeks of assignments,  information in the annual reports) for each 
court in each year for other years, but this is not necessary 
because the adjustments are quite small and do not vary much from 
year to year. 
(41  in 1984,  for example).  According to AOC staff these are 
nearly all short assignments, for such purposes as filling in for 
recused judges.  They do not significantly affect judicial 
manpower. 
The use of retired judges is almost totally limited to Cook 
County.  For example in 1984 thirteen judges were assigned, for 
periods varying from two weeks to a full year, and all but one 
two-week  assignment were to Cook County. 
0 
There are also a few assignments between down state circuits 
DELAY REDUCTION EFFORTS AND COURT CHANGES AFFECTING DELAY 
Speedy trial law. 
Defendants in custody must be tried within 120 days from when 
taken into custody (Ch.  38, Sec. 103-5(a)).  Defendants not in 
custody must be tried within 160 days from when they demand trial 
(Sec.  103-5(b)).  Before March 1, 1977 a new period began when 
delay was caused by: 1) the defendant,  2) an examination for 
competency,  3) a competency hearing, 4) the defendant's physical 
incapacity for trial,  or 5) an interlocutory appeal (Note; 
Rudstein).  Since March 1977 delay caused by these events only 
tolls the time period  (Sec.  103-5(f)).  Delay caused by court 
congestion is charged against the state (People  v. Macklin, 7 
Ill.App.3rd  713, 288 N.E.2d 503 (1972)).  Speedy trial dismissals 
are with prejudice (notes  to Sec. 103-5). 
Since 1979, judges have been required to report semi-annually 
to the AOC the number of dispositions under the speedy trial law, 
but that information has not been compiled. 
A law applicable to crimes committed after January 1,  1984, 
requires that there must be either a preliminary examination  or 
indictment within 30 days of arrest for defendants charged with a 
felony if in custody, and within 60 days if not in custody,  except 
when the delay was caused by the defendant (Sec.  109-3.1). 
Dismissals under this law, however, do not bar refiling the 
charges (Sec.  114-l(a)  (11)  1. 
Effective for cases in which the indictment or information 
occurred after January 1, 1980,  trial judges are authorized to 
dismiss cases over one year old if the state has not exercised due 
diligence in bringing to trial  (Sec.  114-4(e)). The judge must 
0 
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hold a hearing to determine if the state exercised due diligence 
and, if lack of due diligence is found,  give the state one more 
trial date between 14 and 30 days from the data of hearing. If 
state is not ready on this court date, the judge may dismiss the 
case. 
than 30 days after arraignment Itmay  be granted" in several 
specific circumstances,  such as where the attorney is ill.  But 
Section 114-4(d) states that the upon the courts own motion, or 
motion of the parties, a judge may grant a continuance for grounds 
not specified in the statute if the judge "finds that the 
interests of justice so require.  Section 114-4  stated that the 
judge may require that the motion be in writing. 
December 15, 1982, motions must be in writing and supported by 
affidavit (Sec.  114-4  (a)). (Several  commentators,  e.g.,  Bonaguro, 
had claimed that liberal granting of continuances  by trial judges 
was a cause of delay.) 
19th circuits received court administrators,  starting September 1, 
1975 and November 1,  1975, respectively.  Soon after, the AOC 
recommended that all circuits receive court administrators by 
upgrading the position of "administrative  secretary to the Chief 
Circuit Judge" to that of Circuit Court Administrator. 
Starting June 30, 1979,  every six months the circuit chief 
judges are required to report on the number of cases pending 180 
days or more and to explain what measures are taken to reduce the 
number of pending cases.  The same was done for civil law jury 
cases over $15,000  pending two years or more.  Also, court clerks 
are required to report the "composite  age" of pending case, 
separately for all major categories of cases. 
As discussed earlier, a requirement of grand jury indictment 
was removed effective October 1,  1975, and this may have speeded 
the early processing of criminal cases. 
0 
Section 114-4  requires that motions for continuance made more 
Effective 
In an experimental project, funded by the LEAA, the 3rd and 
e 
DATA GATHERING 
Procedures for Gathering 
following: 
(monthly). 
(monthly). 
Each court sends the AOC statistical reports, including the 
Report 1 -  Trend of Cases and Post-termination  Proceedings 
Report 2 -  Disposition of Law Jury Cases Terminate by Verdict 
Report 3  -  Semi-Annual  Report of Age of Pending Law Cases. 
Report 4 -  Disposition of Defendants Charged with Felonies or 
Chief Judges's Report on the Age of Pending Cases (every  six 
Except the last, these reports have been compiled since at 
Misdemeanors Punishable by Imprisonment in Penitentiary and 
Penalty Imposed (monthly)  . 
months; since June, 30, 1979). 
least 1970.  They have been revised slightly over the years, 
especially to take into account statutory changes in criminal 
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cases.  The changes,  however, are not relevant to this study.  The 
AOC compiled the reports manually until 1987. 
the procedures for record keeping and data gathering.  In the 
1960s the Supreme Court established the '!Supreme  Court Committee 
on Record Keeping in the Circuit Courts.11  In 1966 the Committee 
issued draft instructions for maintaining case records, financial 
records, and statistical records.  The statistical reports were 
tied into the record keeping systems.  The report was approved by 
the Supreme Court in 1968.  New manuals were issued in 1972 and 
1983.  The 1983 manual has two parts, the Criminal Procedures 
Manual and the Coding Manual..  The Coding Manual  (for  automated 
data systems) was prepared by SEARCH with LEAA funds; the criminal 
part was completed in 1980 and the civil part in 1981. 
for pending cases and dispositions,  and in some courts for 
inactive pending.  All files are kept in sequential case number 
order (the  case number is given when filed).  Copies of the 
disposition reports (Form  5) go to the state's attorney and to the 
Department of Law Enforcement. 
The circuits send in monthly reports to Springfield from 
downstate and to Chicago from Cook.  These reports "are  analyzed 
for correctness and tabulated,"  in the respective offices. 
By 1981 more than 20 counties established automated data 
processing systems using LEAA funds.  The systems differed, and in 
1978 the Supreme Court adopted Judicial Management Information 
System Standards that require,  among other things, new systems or 
modifications must be approved by the AOC. A  major aim was to 
foster uniformity. 
The courts are required to conduct audits of pending cases 
twice a year and to submit the reports to the chief judge of the 
circuit (the  audit requirements are described below).  From 1979 
to 1985 a staff member of the AOC frequently visited courts to 
render technical assistance with the statistics and to conduct 
spot checks to see that the data were gathered correctly, 
including whether the audits were preformed correctly.  However, 
this function ended when the staff who preformed it left the AOC. 
The AOC traditionally has not conducted training sessions on 
data gathering.  In 1986, however, there was a seminar concerning 
reports to be filed with the state police.  In a questionnaire 
poll of  the clerks,  they recommended statistics more often than 
any other topic for future training programs.  According to an AOC 
staff member, the major reason for this request is that newer 
staff need instructions concerning the data.  The clerks office 
staff call the AOC staff about ten to fifteen times a month with 
questions about the statistics. 
The AOC staff believe that the clerks' office staff are often 
overworked and give statistical work low priority.  They believe, 
however, that the felony statistics are among the most accurate 
received.  The least accurate tend to be in high volume areas, 
such as probate and misdemeanor.  The filings statistics are 
considered the most accurate because the record keeping involved 
The AOC issues a manual, periodically revised,  that details 
Circuit Courts, it appears, keep two or three separate files, 
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it is harder for the clerks to keep track of terminations day by 
day (although  errors here should be found in the audits). 
The AOC staff said there were no circuits in which the data 
appeared particularly bad.  Cook county filing data are not 
comparable to that for the rest of the state (see  below).  Also 
Page County at one time tried to require the states attorneys to 
have separate filings for each defendant. 
DATA ELEMENTS 
Felony filings downstate, according to foot notes in the 
annual reports include "felony  complaints, preliminary hearings, 
indictments and informations."  The cases, therefore, are counted 
at the initial filings,  before findings of probable cause. 
Felonies for Cook County do not include preliminary hearings; 
cases are not counted until a finding of probable cause,  and they 
are not strictly comparable to down state totals.  Filings are 
roughly 80 percent informations and 20 percent indictments;  the 
proportion used to be the other way around, with indictments more 
common before a statutory change (see  above). 
defendant.  As mentioned earlier, the Page County court attempted 
to require the state attorneys to include only a single defendant 
in each instrument.  The filings counted are the number of  filing 
documents submitted by the state attorneys.  Therefore,  state 
attorneys determine what a filing is for the.case  -  whether to 
join different defendants and whether to file separate cases for 
separate crimes or counts.  The joinder of defendants and crimes 
is governed by statute.  When there is more than one offense 
involved in a criminal conduct, they must be joined.in  a single 
prosecution (Ch. 38 Sec.3-3).  The prosecutor may join several 
offenses in the same charge (Ch  38. sec 111-4).  These provisions 
allow considerable discretion to join different defendants,  and 
practices probably vary among state attorneys. 
A statutory change,  effective January 1,  1973, changed the 
definition of felony filings (Ch. 38 Sec 1005rlr9).  Previously, 
there was a separate crime category of "misdemeanors  punishable by 
imprisonment",  and in 1973 this was merged into the felony 
category.  Felony filing figures  before 1973, therefore,  should 
include these misdemeanors. 
felony cases are to be given a case number starting with sCF1f  ( and 
misdemeanors, I1CMl1).  Statistics are maintained separately for 
reinstated and transferred cases, and they are not included in the 
basic filings figures.  Reinstatements are 1) cases returned from 
the appellate court, 2) new trial orders, 3) post-conviction 
proceedings, or 4) resumption of prosecution following termination 
because of the defendant's incompetence or because of an order in 
arrest of judgment. 
Cases transferred are cases where the charge was reduced to a 
misdemeanor; that is, they are transferred to the misdemeanor 
category.  Transferred cases do not include changes in venue, 
The filings statistics are by the case, rather than by 
,-a 
Record keeping instructions,  in effect since 1972, state that 
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Justice.which are counted as regular filings.  A  transferred case is 
considered "terminated"  as a felony case, but it is not counted as 
transferred in.  There were 3,285 criminal transfers in 1984 
(excluding  Cook County) or 14% of the total filings.  There were 
equal numbers of felony cases transferred out as misdemeanor cases 
transferred in.  Felony filings, therefore, include only cases 
that were not transferred. 
statistics counted by case and detailed statistics counted by 
defendant.  Both count dispositions at sentencing for convicted 
defendants. 
The gross disposition statistics count the total number of 
terminations,  which occur when all "orders  amounting to 
termination" are entered to all charges and all defendants.  File 
folders remain in the pending file until case is terminated for 
all defendants.  When there is a conviction, dispositions take 
place after sentencing. 
there is an order for probation (Ch.  56.5, par. 7051, or upon 
entry of an order for supervision (Ch.  91.5, par .  120.9).  The 
1atter.is  prosecution diversion, and apparently not used in felony 
cases.  A termination is not recorded when the cases is later 
dismissed (Manual  B-17).  If these cases are later reactivated, 
they are counted as reinstated cases. 
of dispositions, although publication of these data has not been 
consistent over the years.  These categories include acquitted by 
the court, acquitted by the jury,  guilty plea, convicted by the 
court, and convicted by the jury (the latter three are broken down 
into each class of crime). 
were collected earlier, but not published and not otherwise 
available. 
checks of pending cases as of June 30 and December 31.  The 
pending figures are adjusted according to these counts.  The 
adjustments,  however,  might not be made until the next monthly 
report.  Consequently, the AOC used the pending figures given in 
the January report for the year end pending figures in the annual 
report. 
Before June 1,  1979, the data forms stated that the clerks 
were  to make inventory counts, explaining any 
resulting discrepancies in a footnote to the statistical report. A 
table in the 1977 report (page  129) lists the counties making 
physical inventories of various types of cases.  Ten counties are 
listed for felony cases and 13 for misdemeanor. 
the pending figures,  according to AOC staff. 
rules may provide for a "warrant  calendar" or other similar 
calendar, to which a case is transferred if there is a failure to 
appear within the "recommended  time".  This transfers the case to 
@  a disposition.  It is then counted as misdemeanor cases 
There are two sets of criminal disposition statistics,  gross 
Cases are recorded as dispositions  when 
Data, calculated by defendant, are obtained for detailed types 
-@ 
Pending statistics have been published since 1977.  The data 
The court clerks are required to do semi-annual inventory 
The inventory counts do not often result in major changes in 
Inactive cases are excluded from pending cases.  Local court 
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cases are counted as terminated when placed in inactive status and 
than reinstated if the defendant is later brought before the 
court.  The practice of setting up inactive categories started 
with one court,  the 11th Circuit, in the 1970‘s, and the AOC 
encouraged courts to do it in the late 1970’s, and in the 1980’s 
the great majority of courts do it.  The annual reports,  however, 
note that not all courts follow the procedures of putting inactive 
cases in a pending calendar (the  1984 Report,  page 148).  In 1984 
all counties,  except three in the 14th District,  transferred some 
cases to the inactive calendar.  The annual report first reports 
cases transferred to the warrant calendar in 1980.  About half the 
counties had established a warrant calendar.  For only 7 circuits 
did all counties (or  almost all,  with the exceptions being small 
counties) used a warrant calendar; they are Circuits 1, 8,  11,  12, 
16, 17, and 18. 
The chief judges must send to the Supreme Court a report, 
every six months, on the number of cases pending over 180 days and 
the number of speedy trial dismissals.  Also, the courts compile 
the number of cases filed in that calendar year, the previous 
year, and in each year back about 6 years. 
e 
Trials and Guilty Pleas. 
data are broken down into type of crime.  The trial data are 
separated into court and jury trial convictions and acquittals; 
however, in order to get the conviction data, it is necessary to 
add convictions for all six classes of crimes.  A single trial 
involving several defendants is counted as a trial for each 
defendant.  Data for acquittals are not published after 1989. 
entered after the trial starts, it is counted as a plea 
disposition. 
Trial and guilty plea statistics are by defendant, and the 
-a 
Trials are counted at the time of disposition.  If a plea is 
Time Lapse Measures. 
since 1979 (it was compiled earlier, but not published), and it 
was published through 1992.  These were collected at the request 
of the Supreme Court.  The data available,  published in the annual 
report, are the percent pending over one year.  Since the 
determinant sentencing law went into effect in 1978, this variable 
cannot be used. 
The courts have published information on age of pending cases 
Civil Cases. 
Civil actions are commenced by filing a complaint (Ch  110, 
Sec. 2-201).  Filing data are available for a dozen categories of 
civil cases.  Regular civil consist of  cases, which are 
broken down into four categories,  over and under $50,000 ($15,000 
in earlier years), and jury and nonjury.  The $15,000  division was 
used because it was the limit for magistrates, and some Circuit 
Courts continued to maintain that division internally, and 
associate judges heard cases under that amount (e.g.  Springfield 
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miscellaneous remedies, eminent domain, and municipal 
corporations.  Divorce statistics are stated separately.  The 
counting of tax cases may not be accurate because some counties 
used to count separate objections to taxes as separate cases. 
Therefore, tax cases should be left out of the measure of civil 
cases. 
type of case, as well as the percent of cases pending more than 12 
months (published  since 1980).  The jury trial statistics are 
limited to the number of law cases terminated by verdict. 
There are also statistics on the time frames for law cases 
disposed of by verdict (under 1 year, 1 to 1.5  years, 1.5 to 2 
years, and so on).  And there are data for the average time lapse 
for law jury cases disposed of by verdict. 
Other cases in the civil case category include chancery, 
There are also disposition and pending statistics for each 
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NORTH CAROLINA 
0 
OUTLINE OF COURT STRUCTURE AND PROCEDURES 
The Superior Court is the general jurisdiction court, and it 
hears criminal cases not specifically within the jurisdiction of 
the District Court, the limited jurisdiction court, with limited 
exceptions, mainly misdemeanors that are lesser included offenses 
and guilty pleas to misdemeanors after a felony charge (G.S.  7A- 
271).  The District Court has jurisdiction over non-felonies,  and 
it conducts preliminary examinations in felony cases (G.S.  7A- 
272).  The Superior Court hears misdemeanor appeals de novo,  which 
make up nearly half of the Superior Court criminal filings.  The 
District Court has jurisdiction over civil cases involving limited 
sums. 
half were split in two: 3rd,.  4th, 6th,  7th, 8th, 9th, llth, 15th, 
16th, 17th, 19th,  20th, 25th, 27th and 30th split.  Of these four 
split near to the time of the determinate sentencing law:  The 
15th in 1977, the 17th in 1982,  the 19th in 1979, and the 27th in 
1978. 
data issued by the Administrative Office is county-level. 
in the District Court.  The procedures for screening cases for 
possible dismissal differ greatly among districts,  but few 
prosecutor offices cases before being filed in the District Court. 
Some district attorneys  (DAs) screen before the probably cause 
In 1976 there were 30 districts, and in the next two decades 
District level data are not available after 1996.  The only 
Felony cases are, with few exceptions, initiated by the police 
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over. 
The police take the defendant before a magistrate for an 
initial appearance, at which pretrial release is determined. 
Next, the defendant goes to a first appearance before a district 
judge, which must be within 96  hours after arrest.  Here counsel 
is appointed for indigent defendants.  A probable cause hearing 
must be scheduled within three weeks, and it is seldom waived.  At 
the hearing, the district attorney presents evidence, including 
testimony from witnesses.  If probable cause is found for a felony 
charge,  the district judge binds the case over to the Superior 
Court for grand jury proceedings and,  generally, indictment.  If 
probably cause is found for a misdemeanor only, the case 
proceedings in the District Court  (although  the prosecutor can 
still take the case to the grand jury). 
upon a bill of information or submit a bill in indictment sending 
the case to the grand jury.  In larger counties the grand jury 
sits once a month, but in small counties only once every six 
months (although  the case can be taken to a grand jury in an 
adjacent county).  Except in capital cases, indictment may be 
waived, but rarely is.  Nearly all submissions result in 
indictments (Clarke,  et al., 111).  Cases generally proceed to the 
Superior Court within a month of filing (Clarke,  et al., 111)  .  A 
few DAs bypass the probable cause hearing.  They either file 
(by  the police) in the District Court and refile it in the 
After the defendant is  bound over, the DA can either proceed 
.initially  as an indictment,  or they dismiss the case after filed  La  Superior Court. 
The DA's prepare the calendars, and judges usually exercise 
little control over the flow of felony cases.  The DA is required 
to file with the court at least a week before the trial date a 
list of cases he intends to call for trial during the session. 
The DA controls the criminal calendar and decides when to set 
cases for trial  (see.  Shirley v. North Carolina, 528 F.2d 819 (4th 
Cir. 1975); North Carolina Conference of District Attorneys). 
All criminal trials in the Superior Court are jury trials. 
Plea bargaining can take place at any time, including when the 
case is in the District Court.  In some districts the DA's and 
defendants bargain cases down to a misdemeanor, such that the case 
does not reach the Superior Court.  A study of 12 courts in 1979 
found that 21 percent of the original felony filings plead to 
misdemeanor at the District Court; also, the prosecutor dismissed 
20 percent of the cases and the judges dismissed 6  percent 
(Clarke,  et all. p. 111-117). Only 52 percent proceeded to the 
grand jury.  These figures were roughly similar for the different 
courts. 
After indictment,  dismissals are less common than in the 
District Court.  Most defendants plead guilty,  but often to a 
misdemeanor. 
Since July 1975 judges have been allowed to participate in 
plea discussions (Sec.  15A-l021(a).  The prosecution and defense 
can reach a binding agreement on charges,  but not on the sentence. 
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including the recommended sentence,  can be submitted to the judge 
includes agreement on sentence,  the sentences must be disclosed to 
the judge, and if the judges does not agree with the sentence 
agreement, the defendant may withdraw the plea  (G.S.  15A-1023). 
As a practical matter, a majority of the pleas are such "formal 
pleas" -  i.e., they are accompanied by such formal agreements, 
accompanied by a written statement of terms.  Clarke et al. found 
that 56 percent of the pleas were formal pleas, and that most of 
these (37  percent of  all pleas) had specific sentence 
recommendations. 
in the mid-1970's DA practices varied greatly on such matters as 
the extent of plea bargaining and the type of bargaining -  e.g., 
whether to reduce charges or recommend a specific sentence (Bond). 
It has been alleged that defendants who plea guilty usually 
receive lighter sentences (Clarke  et al. 40-41;  Lefstein, p. 449; 
Bond, p. 830). 
for advance approval (15A-1023  (b)).  If the plea agreement 
An empirical study,  based on questionnaire to DAs, found that 
_. 
JUDGES AND ATTORNEYS 
state wide ballots.  In addition there are 8 "special judges,"  who 
are appointed by the governor and who have all the authority of 
regular judges (G.S.  7A-45).  The judges are assigned by the 
supreme court, based on calendars prepared by the Administrative 
Office of the Courts (AOC)  and published each year.  A judge is 
assigned to a court for a period of a week to six months.  Judges 
typically sit in their home districts about half the time,  and 
they nearly always sit within one of the state's four court 
divisions. 
week  (and  whether it is a criminal,  civil, or mixed court 
session).  The supreme court orders that assign judges are called 
"commissions." Special judges are not in the yearly assignment 
calendar, and they are used to fill in where needed.  The calendar 
is regularly adjusted.  Some adjustments are formal; the weekly 
assignments are changed in written orders.  Others are last minute 
changes, for example when a judge completes business in a court 
before the end of the week and than hears cases. 
and backlog, there may well be a reciprocal association between 
the number of judges and delay.  A positive association could be 
caused by the assignment of more judges when delay develops. 
Also, a negative association could be created when a D.A. reduces 
the backlog by stepping up the number of cases calendared,  and 
asks for more judges to handle the extra caseload. 
judges are retired judges under the age of retirement, and they 
had to have a commission from the governor (G.S.  7A-52  and 53). 
In 1981 the legislature authorized the use of retired judges who 
are over the age of retirement.  The "temporary  recall" is done by 
The Superior Court judges are elected to eight year terms in 
0 
The calendar states which judge is to sit in which county each 
Since the judges are assigned partly on the basis of caseload 
There are two mechanisms for using retired judges.  Emergency 
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judges are used primarily in the summer to fill in for  vacationing 
available at G.S.  7A-41.  All assistant DAs are paid by the state 
and all are full time.  Because vacancies are infrequent,  the 
actual number is close to the authorized number.  The Conference 
of District Attorneys claims that the DA offices are badly 
understaffed.  Defense of indigent is funded by the state.  Most 
counties have assigned counsel systems. 
judges. 
The number of assistant district attorneys authorized is 
DELAY REDUCTION EFFORTS AND OTHER CHANGES AFFECTING DELAY 
Speedy Trial Law. 
The North Carolina Speedy trial act was enacted in 1977, 
effective for cases initiated on or after October 1, 1978 (G.S. 
15A-701).  The previous law stated that the judge may order a 
trial within 30 days, upon petition of a defendant who has waited 
more than 60 days for trial.  The 1977 act sets a 120 day limit 
for trial in felony cases.  The starting event is the latest of: 
arrest, service of process, indictment,  or waiver of indictment. 
A similar 120 day limit was established for misdemeanor appeals, 
with the time starting at the next regularly scheduled criminal 
session of the Superior Court.  The original legislation called 
for a reduction to 90 days in 1980,  but the 120 day limit was 
first temporarily extended and then made permanent. 
teeth because the time limit can be easily extended, and because 
the dismissal may not be with prejudice.  The AOC statistics show 
that very few cases are dismissed because of the speedy trial 
laws.  But the AOC staff believe the laws do reduce delay through 
persuasion.  Its enactment was accompanied by a general delay 
reduction climate.  DA’s  may use the law as an excuse to refuse 
requests for continuances.  The speedy trial law may stimulate 
prosecutors to make sure enough judges are assigned to their 
counties.  Also, the AOC staff believed the laws may have had an 
anticipatory impact. 
The defendant waives speedy trial rights by not requesting 
dismissal.  The trial judge has discretion to dismiss with or 
without prejudice (G.S.  15A-703).  If the case is reinstated, the 
time limit for the new filing starts at the time of the new 
filing,  whereas in all other situations  where charges are 
dismissed and reinstated -  except where there is a finding of no 
probably cause -  the time under a new filing starts with the 
initial arrest or other beginning event  (G.S.  15A-701(a)(3)). 
the defendant, such as mental examinations and hearings on 
pretrial motions, 2) prosecutorial deferral, 3) absence of the 
defendant or essential witness, 4) incapacity of the defendant, 5) 
when the charge is dismissed by the prosecution under G.S. 15A- 
931,  6)  when the defendant has been joined for trial with another, 
whose time has not run, 7) a continuance for which the judge finds 
(in  writing) that the ends of justice served by granting the 
According to the AOC staff, the-speedy  trial law has little 
a 
The 120 limit is tolled for 1) other proceedings concerning 
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in a speedy trial, 8) when the court holds court sessions so 
infrequently that the limit cannot be met  (an  amendment effective 
October 1,  1983, stated that the county is conclusively  presumed 
to fall in this category if the court holds less than 8 criminal 
or mixed sessions a year), or the court otherwise determines that 
there are not sufficient sessions), 9) when the defendant is 
imprisoned elsewhere, 10) when the defendant is in military 
service (and the prosecution and defendant agree to the delay), 
11) time between when the DA dismisses case because the defendant 
was absent an when the proceedings are reinstated, 12) when 
charges are dismissed and then reinstated, the time between when 
the two events, 13) time between services of process and when DA 
receives notice of the service (only  when the defendant has failed 
to appear),  14) time between when the defendant failed to appear 
and when the DA received notice of it, and 15) time between when 
the defendant returns from hospital treatment and the DA receives 
notice of the return.  The first ten exclusions were in the 
original statute.  Exclusions 12 to 15 were added in June, 1981. 
G.S.  15A-702, part of the original speedy trial law, states 
that defendants in counties falling under exclusion 8 above may 
request a prompt trial before a Superior Court judge elsewhere in 
the district or by a District Court judge in the district. 
The speedy trial law can be considered to have begun about 
January 1,  1979, because its beginning date, October 1, 1978, 
applied to indictments,  etc.,  on that date such that .the (direct) 
effect of the law on court statistics would not appear until a few 
months later.  The speedy trial law can be coded to apply only to 
counties with frequent criminal sessions.  Although not effective 
until 1983, the designation of over 7 criminal or mixed sessions a 
year probably applies to earlier years.  The AOC collects data on 
the number of speedy trial law dismissals.  In 1987 there were 25 
speedy trial dismissals, or 0.1 percent of all dispositions. 
(According  to AOC staff, until about 1984 the speedy trial 
dismissal figures included a relatively large number of mistakes, 
such that the figures  were about double the real figure.  There 
are so few such dismissals, that a few mistaken entries have a 
large proportionate impact on the figures.) 
0 
Other Delay Reduction Efforts. 
delay reduction efforts in criminal cases.  The District 
Attorney's Association, started in early 1984, is trying to help 
DA's expedite procedures.  The association, which has one 
professional staff member, holds meetings twice a year on delay 
matters, has a committee on delay reduction (which  is only 
moderately active), sends the DAs quarterly statistical reports on 
delay, and conducts technical assistance to DAs with major delay 
problems. 
early 1980's.  Part of this push was Court Rule 2,  revised in 
about 1980 to give senior resident Superior Court judges (1.e. 
Other than the speedy trial law, the courts have not conducted 
There was a major delay reduction  push for civil cases in the 
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procedures.  Previously civil case calendaring was done by the a 
committee chaired by the court clerk, and in practice a case was 
calendared only of the attorney wished. 
DATA GATHERING 
Procedures for Gathering. 
1976, is based on individual case reports sent in by the courts. 
Previously, the courts sent in quarterly statistical reports.  The 
system has been revised twice since, 
other changes, 
cases were promptly reported, and the second provided for more 
elaborate statistical categories and issued a revised manual. The 
new manual is effective July 1,  1984, and thus applies to the 1985 
data.  But the AOC made a concerted effort to keep time series 
data consistent for major categories.  This includes data for 
filings,  pending, age of pending, and age of disposition. 
half have automated systems.  For the manual systems, the AOC 
receives a copy of the docket card when the case enters the 
Superior Court, and then a copy when the case is disposed. For 
automated courts, the data are entered at the court and sent 
directly to the AOC. 
The data were gathered on a calendar year basis through 1978, 
and fiscal year ending June 30 there after. 
A major problem with individual case reporting is that the 
courts may fail to submit copies of docket sheets, especially when 
the case is disposed.  The AOC takes several steps to deal with 
this problem.  At courts with manual systems,  at the end of the 
year the AOC makes a concerted effort to collect the case sheets. 
Every six months the AOC sends a list of cases pending and asks 
the courts to check it  (Manual  p. 108).  Occasionally,  the AOC 
staff conducts spot checks of pending cases.  Finally, if the 
numbers look out of line, the AOC staff asks the court clerks to 
double check their information.  The AOC staff claim that clerks 
seldom fail to send dispositions in, but before 1980 there was a 
problem in  this regard because the AOC may not have monitored the 
local courts. 
AOC staff involved with the earlier data gathering, however, 
claimed that the courts conducted physical inventories of pending 
case and, thus, the data were very accurate.  When the new system 
was initiated in 1976 the AOC took physical inventory of pending 
cases and found that numbers reported for earlier years were often 
inaccurate.  The 1976 annual reports states that the data were 
"verified."  Since then,  with few exceptions, the AOC has not 
conducted physical inventories. 
their record keeping and filing systems.  This involves frequent 
on site analysis of court records, but does not involve 
statistical audits. 
The present data system,  started with statistics for the year 
in 1980 and 1984.  Among 
the first added procedures to make sure disposed 
In the mid-1980s  half the local courts had manual systems and 
0 
The AOC for some time has had a program to help courts improve 
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The AOC has published a data collection manual, which was 
As noted above, there is differing opinion concerning whether 
audits to check each case and make sure information is entered on 
the computer correctly. 
revised in 1984. 
the pre 1980 data are a problem, and because they were not there 
during that period, the present AOC statistical system staff 
cannot provide definite information about how accurate the data 
are.  There was less effort to ensure that information  concerning 
all dispositions was sent to the AOC. 
improved the data, and before then, according to a staff member, 
the data are reliable in the aggregate. 
Mecklenburg County (Charlotte)  has been a major problem.  The 
clerk has not handled the data well, and the court,  which was the 
first to automate,  has a different computer than the AOC. 
A former staff member of a DA office in District 15B stated 
that Annual Report data for the court were very inaccurate, 
thought this may have been the worse district. 
quality problems, simply because one or a few  mistakes can make a 
disproportionate impact on the total numbers. 
.The  1984 revision also 
but he 
Also, the AOC staff believed that smaller counties have more 
DATA ELEMENTS 
Criminal Filings. 
that originates by indictment, information,  presentment, finding 
of probable cause at the District Court, or a waiver of probable 
cause.  Filings are counted by the case. 
is in practice determined by the DAs and District Court 
magistrates, and their practices differ concerning whether a to 
join counts or defendants in a single case. 
indictment is counted as one cases.  Cases with serial acts, such 
as bad checks or multiple burglaries, may be filed as one or 
several cases.  The AOC also gathers data on number of 
defendants, and defendant based figures are about 30 percent 
lower. 
The definition of a Superior Court felony filing is a case 
The definition of a case 
A multiple count 
- -.  Criminal Dispositions. 
or dismissal (at not at the time of sentencing).  The statistics 
show two types of dismissals, those with and without leave.  The 
former can be refiled,  and are typically used when the defendant 
is not available.  The extent to which DA's  clean the docket of 
such deadwood cases is uncertain, and probably differs from court 
to court.  Dismissals with leave make up only about 3  percent of 
the felony dispositions, and the proportion varies greatly from 
court to court.  Clarke et al. (p.  111-117) found that the average 
time to disposition for dismissals by leave was 156 days, as 
opposed to about a 100 days for other dispositions.  The number of 
dismissals with leave in the Superior Court were equalled by the 
Dispositions are counted at the time of verdict, guilty plea, 
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indicating that most no shows occur at the probable cause hearing. 
agreement.  Deferred prosecution cases are not counted as 
dispositions until the case is dismissed without leave,  but there 
are vary few such cases (18 in 86R113).  Deferred sentencing, 
called "prayer  for judgment continued",  or PJC,  was found to be 
very uncommon in 1979 (Clarke  et al.,  p. 111); and they are 
counted as dispositions when the plea is taken. 
The number of dispositions is based on the number of 
disposition sheets sent in by the courts.  Some arrive late, such 
that the end pending each year is larger than the beginning 
pending for the next year as reflected in the next annual report 
for nearly all years.  Therefore,  the most accurate number of 
dispositions is obtained by adjusting the figures for the 
difference between end pending and beginning pending the next 
year. 
Dismissals  without leave are often part of a plea bargaining  0 
Criminal Pending. 
pending.  Inactive cases are placed in a category similar to an 
inactive docket:  Cases with missing defendants are dismissed with 
leave at the request of the DA, and the case is reinstated when 
the defendant returns.  These dismissals with leave comprise only 
a small portion of the caseload, and their time to disposition are 
not much larger than other cases (see  section 1.2 above). 
Because pending case figures are adjusted, the  beginning 
pending for the next year is a better measure of pending than 
pending at year end.  It is used in this study. 
the end pending for 1978, because of the change to fiscal year 
(FYI statistics in 1979.  The numbers differ for individual 
districts, but are similar for the state as a whole. 
The statistics do not distinguish between active and inactive 
0 
The beginning pending figures for 1979 cannot be compared to 
Criminal Trials. 
The annual reports contain statistics for the number of cases 
disposed by jury trial.  There are no non-jury  criminal trials in 
the state.  When there is a plea after the trial starts, the case 
is counted as a trial disposition. 
The annual reports contain data for  dispositions by guilty 
plea.  Since 1985, this is broken down into guilty pleas as 
charged and guilty pleas to a lesser offense (which  is defined as 
a plea to an offense not charged; so this category does not 
include pleas to lesser offenses charged), and the number of 
negotiated pleas is given.  The "negotiated  pleas" figures come 
from a box to check in the data form, and it is checked in nearly 
all cases. 
Time Lapse Measures. 
for  both cases pending and disposed, for a total of  six measures. 
The three are: 
The annual reports provides three types of time lapse measures 
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2)  Median time (available  since 1979). 
3)  Age of cases (available  since 1976 for  pending case and 
The time intervals vary from year to year. 
1977 for dispositions). 
or disposed up to 4  months is available since 1979;  the number 
disposed up to 6  months is available since 1977,  and the number 
pending up to 6  months is available since 1976  (the  AOC conducted 
a case inventory in 1976).  The various measures are quite closely 
correlated. 
The number pending 
Judge Data. 
district because the assignments are too fluid.  The state is 
divided into four divisions, within which the judges rotate.  They 
are seldom assigned outside the division.  In addition to regular 
judges, the state has eight special judges, appointed by the 
governor, who are assigned throughout the state, and can makeup 
for shortfalls in individual districts or divisions. 
It is not feasible to determine the number of judges in each 
Civil Data . 
Since the Superior Court does not have jurisdiction  over 
domestic relations cases, the category of total civil cases are 
regular civil cases.  Statistics are available for filed, 
disposed, end pending cases (like  criminal cases, the pending 
figures are corrected in the following year).  The disposition 
figures included trial dispositions,  broken down into jury and 
nonjury trial dispositions.  The definition of nonjury trials 
changed in 1984 and, therefore,  present figures are not comparable 
to earlier figures. 
criminal cases.  The analysis hear includes the median and average 
time for disposed and pending cases,  but does not include the 
figures for age-of-case  data. 
0 
Delay measures for civil cases are similar to those for 
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"Predicting  and Reducing Court-Case  Time Through Simple 
NEW MEXICO 
OUTLINE OF COURT STRUCTURE AND  PROCEDURES 
The District Court is the general jurisdiction court.  The 
states 33  counties are organized into 13 districts, and the Second 
District, Bernalillo County, is by far the largest.  The limited 
jurisdiction court in Bernalillo county is the Metropolitan Court, 
and the Magistrate Court elsewhere.  Their jurisdiction includes 
misdemeanors and minor civil cases. 
DATA 
Data begin in 1974,  but there are no 1980 data because the 
state switched from a calendar year to a fiscal year.  Also, data 
for 1995 could not be obtained.  Criminal data are for the number 
of defendants charged with felonies.  The data include reopenned 
cases (25-30% of the cases) and a few misdemeanors  (less  than 3% 
of the total), mainly appeals. 
the year are published for 1974-1996,  and then again in 1999  (but 
the 1999 data are not entered due to the gap between 96 and 99). 
Pending data before 1978 are uncertain.  Through 77 the end 
pending is always the same as the beginning pending the next year. 
Then in 1978 the beginning pending is different from 77 end 
pending.  That is, it appears that until 1978 the courts 
calculated end pending by using end pending in prior year, adding 
filings, and subtracting dispositions.  Then there was an actual 
count in 78,  when a new computer system was installed.  (The 
problem can be seen from the 3rd district, where there is a typo 
in the criminal pending at the end of 76,  166 instead of 66.  The 
beginning pending is set at 166 for 77,  and the end pending is 
Data for pending cases at the beginning of the year and end of 
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and 77 were corrected in this data set). 
The pending data were adjusted by making the beginning pending 
the end pending for the prior year (the  published end pending data 
are use for 1979, 1994, and 1996 because beginning pending for the 
following years is not available).  Thus the 1977 end pending is 
the result of the apparent recount in 1978.  pending data before 
1977 are deleted where major changes were made in the apparent 
recounts (that is,  the adjustment is more than 25% of the new 
pending figure, except that a figure of 40% is used when the 
backlog index changed little over the period).  Moreover, all 
pending data in districts 4 and 12 were dropped because pending 
data are very inconsistent (with several adjustments of over 25% 
over the period of the study). 
When comparing pending from different years (pending  in prior 
year,  plus filings, less dispositions) the figures are way off for 
about half the districts in 1978.  It is off slightly for 86 and 
87 for several districts.  Also District 2  (albuquerque)  quite 
often is off a little bit, which indicates a continual adjusting 
of pending. 
The civil data include domestic relation cases.  Also, the 
civil data include refilings, like the criminal data.  Year-end 
pending data, like criminal pending, are the beginning pending 
from the next year except where the next year’s  data are not 
available. 
.  .. 
..  ...: . 
VIRGINIA 
OUTLINE OF COURT STRUCTURE  AND PROCEDURES 
divided into 31 circuits.  It has jurisdiction over felony cases 
and misdemeanor cases that originated from a grand jury 
indictment.  The limited jurisdiction court, the district court, 
which holds preliminary hearings in felony cases and hears 
misdemeanor cases.  The trial court structure and circuit 
boundaries have not changed since the 1970s. 
Felony cases usually have grand jury indictments.  If there is 
a trial, either the defendant or the prosecutor can demand that it 
be a jury trial. 
The circuit court is the court of general jurisdiction.  It is 
JUDGES 
The courts also use retired judges to help with the caseloads.  In 
1999  use of these judges totalled 2,649 days, or 10.6 full-time 
equivalents,  or 7.2% of the number of regular judges.  No circuits 
received services equivalent to a full time judge, and the 
increase in judicial manpower did not exceed one fifth of the 
norman judicial resources. 
Judges are appointed for specific circuits, and remain there. 
DATA 
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or case).  A  count is specific crime alleged by the prosecutor, 
and there are often two or more counts against a defendant. 
might be two separate crimes committed in a short period of crime, 
such as successive  burglaries.  It also might be two crime charges 
for a single incident,  such as rape and burglary committed at the 
same time.  The number of counts in a case varies with prosecutor 
practice. 
since 1984, for filings only, and overall in the state there were 
155% more counts than defendants in 1999.  This figure has grown, 
and in 1986 there were 117% more counts than defendants. 
Pending data begin in 1984, when actual counts of pending 
cases were made.  In succeeding years, the pending number was 
estimated by adding filings and subtracting dispositions. 
pendings were recounted for all circuits. 
intervening years in several circuits. 
differed greatly from calculations based on  past pending data. 
For 15 of the 31 circuits the difference was more than 25% the 
circuit pending data are counted as missing data. 
of in specific time frames,  such as 0 to 2 months, 2 to 4 months. 
The time frames changed in 1984, but consistent series are 
available for 0-5  and 0-9 months. 
This 
Data on  the number of defendants is also available 
In 1998 
Recounts were made in 
The recounts often 
Data are available since 1978 for the number of cases disposed 
WASHINGTON 
OUTLINE OF COURT STRUCTURE  AND PROCEDURES 
has 31 court districts.  There are 39 counties in the state,  and 
all but six districts contain only one county.  Since the early 
1980s two districts were split, and they are joined in this 
analysis, such that there is a total of 29 courts for the 
analysis.  The major limited jurisdiction court is the District 
Court, which hears misdemeanors and civil cases involving small 
amounts.  There were 170 judges in 1999.  By far the largest 
district is King County,  with 49 judges. 
The court of general jurisdiction is the Superior Court,  which 
DELAY REDUCTION EFFORTS AND OTHER CHANGES AFFECTING DELAY 
A  Case Management Work Group was founded in 1987 to reduce 
delay in King, Pierce,  and Snohomish Counties.  The major effort 
was in King county.  It created a criminal department with fifteen 
judges (two  new judges in 1989) two new judges assigned to 
criminal cases.  It tried to reduce delay by increasing the number 
of trials held.  This did not reduce the backlog.  Then in 1990 
there was a crash program to get rid of backlog.  The attorneys 
meet for possible settlements. Twenty two judges from other 
counties volunteered time, and fourteen retired judges and three 
attorneys served as judges pro tern.  The prosecutors office got 
volunteers among former members of office.  More jurors were 
summoned.  Counsels chambers and judges conference rooms were used 
for trials.  By end of August 1990 the backlog was over. 
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Approximately five percent of the cases are misdemeanors, mainly 
appeals from the District court. 
For a there to be a non-jury  trial there must have been a 
witness sworn in.  For there to be a jury trial the jury must have 
been impaneled, voir dire conducted, and the jury sworn in.  There 
need not be a trial verdict, for example when the defendants 
pleads guilty during the trial.  After 1992 the definition of jury 
trial was changed to require that some evidence be presented. 
For some reason, King County trial rates went way down, by half, 
between 1984 and 1988.  Nonjury trial especially went down. 
end of the year.  It does not include use of retired judges, 
attorneys temporarily assigned as judges, or judges temporarily 
assigned from another court. 
There are no pending data or any other measure of delay. 
The statistical system changed somewhat in 1983 and 1992, 
mainly by increasing the number of data elements collected.  The 
data are not audited by the AOC.  Effective for cases filed after 
January 1,  1981 de novo appeals from the District court were 
abolished and a trial on the record substituted.  This causes a 
substantial reduction in both criminal and civil filings in 1981, 
and a modest reduction in the number of trial held.  The impact 
varied greatly from county to county.  Therefore, we have deleted 
data prior to 1982 from the analysis. 
In criminal cases the unit of count is the defendant. 
The number of judges is the number of full-time  judges at the 
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